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I.

INTRODUCTION

Since 1947 the Establishment Clause' has been a substantive check on
governmental activity at all levels.2 More than four decades later, the content of that check remains unsettled. The United States Supreme Court

gave the Establishment Clause its predominant modem voice in 1971 in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.' Under the Lemon approach, all government practices are measured by the same standard. To survive constitutional attack,
a practice "must have a secular purpose; it must neither advance nor inhibit

religion in its principal or primary effect; and it must not foster an excessive
entanglement with religion." 4 In nearly all cases decided since, this standard has acted as the constitutional benchmark.' Notwithstanding its long

tenure, Lemon's influence is clearly waning, and its status as the principal
constitutional gauge appears to be over. 6
* Assistant Professor, Mississippi College School of Law.
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONsT.
amend. I.
2. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that the Establishment Clause applied against the states by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
3. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
4. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 61213); see also Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-73
(1973).
5. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2663 n.4 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) ("Since 1971,
the Court has decided 31 Establishment Clause cases. In only one instance, the decision of Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), has the Court not rested its decision on the basic principles
described in Lemon.").
6. In Lee, the Court invalidated public school invocations and benedictions in Providence,
Rhode Island, and formally declined to consider the continuing vitality of Lemon:
This case does not require us to revisit the difficult questions dividing us in recent cases,
questions of the definition and full scope of the principles governing the extent of permitted
accommodation by the State for the religious beliefs and practices of many of its citizes.... For without reference to those principles in other contexts, the controlling prece-
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When the Court surveyed its decisions in 1971, it concluded that the

constraints of the Establishment Clause manifest themselves in terms of
purpose, effect, and entanglement.7 If the Court were to repeat that survey

today, as it prepares to bury Lemon, it would discover that Lemon has
engendered four distinctly separate prohibitions. First, a group of cases enforces familiar principles of equality. Any government regulation that employs a religious classification is subject to a heavy presumption of
invalidity. In almost all circumstances, government may not impose bur-

dens or distribute benefits on a religious basis. Thus, government cannot
chose a vendor because she is an atheist or restrict the practice of law to
Episcopalians. Doctrinally, the restraining principles of religious equality
have close analogs to equal protection principles that enforce a norm of

racial equality.8
Second, a group of cases prohibits certain government subsidies of reli-

gious activity. As a consequence, government is not free to underwrite the
religious activities of religious organizations. Most notably, of course, the
Court has proscribed many forms of government aid that benefit religiously
affiliated elementary and secondary schools. However, broader programs
that serve secular objectives and involve predominantly secular beneficiaries
have routinely been allowed to provide aid to the secular activities of religdents as they relate to prayer and religious exercise in primary and secondary public
schools compel the holding here that the policy of the city of Providence is an unconstitutional one. We can decide the case without reconsidering the general constitutional framework by which public schools' efforts to accommodate religion are measured. Thus we do
not accept the invitation of petitioners and amicus the United States to reconsider our
decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman....
Id. at 2655 (citations omitted).
However, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion relied on principles other than the Lemon
standards:
It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may
not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a
way which "establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so." The State's
involvement in the school prayers challenged today violates these central principles.
Id. (citations omitted).
Moreover, four other members of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White,
Scalia, and Thomas, seemed poised to discard Lemon. See id. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. Justice Blackmun said, "In 1971, Chief Justice Burger reviewed the Court's past decision!
and found: 'Three... tests may be gleaned from our cases."' Id. at 2663 (Blackmun, J., concur
ring) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13).
8. The one significant exception to the prohibition against religious classifications is that go,
ernment sometimes has been allowed to facilitate free religious exercise, chiefly by exemptil
religion from a regulatory burden. Arguably, government attempts to promote free religious ext
cise conflict with the constitutional prohibition against establishment, illustrating what has be
viewed as the tension between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. The permissi
scope of government efforts to "accommodate" religion is very much unsettled.

1992] MODERN CONSTRAINTS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE 905
iously affiliated organizations. Real difficulty arises only when aid to the
religious activities of religious organizations cannot be eliminated without
compromising a program's objectives.
Third, another group of cases imposes limits on religious exhortations
by government. Hence, a state legislature may not resolve that this is the
year to bring all wayward souls. The cases in this group should be understood to silence some government speech; they do not turn on messages that
emanate from general governmental policies. The cases impose limits specifically on expression; they do not merely apply a general standard in the
context of expressive activity. It is from these cases that a prohibition
against endorsement has derived, and it is to these cases that it should be
confined.
Fourth, the final group of cases prevents government intrusion into certain central church affairs.' In one line of cases, the Court has forbidden
judicial resolution of questions concerning a church's creed, governance, or
discipline. Such issues are, in effect, nonjusticiable. In a second line of
cases, the Court has held that restrictions on aid to parochial schools,
designed to avoid unconstitutional subsidies, can unconstitutionally "entangle" government in church affairs. Specifically, the executive branch of
government cannot maintain ongoing surveillance over the religious operations of these religious groups. This final group of cases thus creates a
sphere where churches are autonomous.
This article is largely a doctrinal synthesis. It identifies the four doctrinal patterns into which the Court's Establishment Clause cases have settled
and explores what can be learned from the fact that the Court has addressed over two decades of issues in these terms. The main conclusion is
that, at its center, each of the four prohibitions guards against a very different form of government behavior. Lemon failed because it spoke in terms
that were insufficiently focused on the differing nature of each underlying
problem. Lemon states that government action may not have the primary
effect of advancing religion, but government may advance religion in varying ways, depending on whether government acts as lawmaker, speaker,
benefactor, or referee.
Looking past Lemon, perhaps the principal lesson is that any unitary
approach is likely to prove unsatisfactory.10 Coherent legal standards must,
9. Here and elsewhere throughout the paper, I use church interchangeably with religious
organization.
10. Present members of the Court have advanced proposals under which all Establishment
Clause cases are decided by reference to some other single set of tests or principles other than the
Lemon standards. Justice O'Connor would always inquire whether a reasonable observer would
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at least, be sensitive to the differences between the four problems which
underlie the Court's decisions to date. This paper articulates four legal tests

that, unlike the Lemon approach, are sufficiently focused to provide a
framework for deciding cases. In addition, these tests, which were generated by synthesizing the Court's decisions, salvage much of the experience
gained under Lemon.
Two further points about the scope of this paper bear mention. First,

various forms of prohibited government behavior may derive from essentially the same wrong. After all, there is just one Establishment Clause and
constitutional violations might therefore be expected to share common essential features. This paper, though, does not undertake to determine the
extent to which the proscriptions of the Establishment Clause are unified by
a single policy or reflect some overarching constitutional value." Ideas at
perceive that government has endorsed a religious practice or belief. Whitters v. Washington
Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 493 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy has identified:
[T]wo limiting principles: government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous
indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such to a degree that in fact "establishes a
[state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so."
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citations omitted).
Since County of Allegheny, two Justices who joined in that opinion split decidedly over what
constitutes coercion. CompareLee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655-61 (majority opinion of Kennedy, J.) (subtle coercive pressures adequate) with id. at 2683-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (legal coercion
required).
11. Consequently, this paper cannot evaluate whether, as a normative matter, the constitutional proscriptions are right or wrong. Nevertheless, this paper has a contribution to make on
that front. Debate over what the Establishment Clause ought to do is better informed by a
sharper perception of what modern constitutional doctrine has done. To decide what should replace Lemon, if Lemon is indeed gone, properly begins with a clear picture of what is to be replaced.
The Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause to protect underlying religious freedoms,
variously described, through intermediate buffers of neutrality toward religion and separation of
church and state. Most often, the Court has identified the religion clauses as protecting freedom
of conscience. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 50-51 n.35 (1985) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940)); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164-65 (1944); see also School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985)
(holding that the Establishment Clause protects freedom of conscience and the autonomy of religious organizations).
Individual Justices have advanced other ideas. Justice Brennan has identified four purposes
served by the principles of separation and neutrality: freedom of conscience; noninterference in
the essential autonomy of religious life; prevention of the trivialization and degradation of religion; and avoidance of religious issues precipitating political battles. Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 803-06 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
Chief Justice Burger has written that "the three main evils against which the Establishment
Clause was intended to afford protection [are] 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involve-

1992] MODERN CONSTRAINTS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE 907

that level of abstraction are simply too general to explain or decide cases.12
Lemon is a doctrinal statement designed to provide a framework for deciding cases, and this article examines Lemon's legacy with this particularly in
mind. Moreover, a single constitutional standard may be ill suited for identifying even a single wrong which manifests itself in various contexts.13
Second, the four essentially separate restraining principles were developed in four contexts which are likewise essentially different. This does not
mean, necessarily, that a given principle must stay confined to its present

ment of the sovereign in religious activity."' Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
Justice O'Connor has described the common purpose of the Establishment and Free Exercise
concurring) (citClauses as protecting "religious liberty." Wallace, 472 U.S. at 68 (O'Connor, J.,
ing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962)).
12. See, e.g., John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CAL. L. REv. 847, 848, 906 (1984) (Ultimately, for "the satisfactory
resolution of problems under the religion clauses, it is necessary to explore and expound a philosophy of the Constitution regarding human nature, human destiny and other realities," from which,
among other things, "intermediate principles [actually] useful in deciding particular questions"
can be derived.).
13. To eat too much dietary fat can cause obesity, high blood cholesterol, and heart disease,
yet a scale alone is an insufficient diagnostic tool. For scholarly attempts to articulate a generally
applicable constitutional standard, see, eg., Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizingthe Heavenly and
EarthlySpheres: The Fragmentationand Synthesis of Religion, Equality, andSpeech in the Constitution, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 89, at n.21 (1990) (Establishment Clause issues are essentially Equal
Protection problems); Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clausesof the FirstAmendment: Reconciling
the Conflict, 41 U. Prir. L. REv. 673, 675 (1980) (Two proposed standards, one for evaluating
religious practices in public schools, and one for evaluating financial aid to religious institutions,
"encompass a single principle: The establishment clause should forbid only government action
whose purpose is solely religious and that is likely to impair religious freedom by coercing, compromising, or influencing religious beliefs."); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Motivation, Rationality,
and Secular Purpose in Establishment Clause Review, 1985 ARiz. ST. L.J. 677 (arguing for a
"meaningful secular purpose test-through more careful scrutiny of governmental purposes and
motivations-within the framework of the Lemon test"); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Separationof
Church and State.: And the Wall Came Tumbling Down, 18 VAL. U. L. REV. 707, 726 (1984)
(Proposing two standards: 1) "Where government provides financial assistance to religious entities
the purpose must be secular and the assistance must be uniformly provided;" and 2) "Where
government permits religion to intrude into the public realm or it otherwise acts for a religious
purpose, it must meet strict scrutiny analysis."); Gary J.Simpson, The Establishment Clause in
the Supreme Court Rethinking the Court'sApproach, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 905 (1987) (proposing modifications to the Lemon standards); see also Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a GeneralTheory of
the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1113, 1172-87 (1988) (The Court's Establishment
Clause cases defensibly embody a separationist theme and a subtheme of allowing certain traditional government practices which favor religion). But see Philip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in FirstAmendment Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. Rv. 817 (1984) (Religion Clause doctrine is
"radically indeterminate," and "we ought not to be shocked at the frank acknowledgement that
our attitudes about religious truth and the social value of prevailing religious practices influence
how we chose to interpret the Constitution's mysterious phrases.").
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context. Much of this article evaluates the extent to which one proscription
would have utility outside its present parameters.
The discussion is organized as follows. Part II A through D separates
the cases according to which of the four basic problems they involve, and
defines the doctrinal proscriptions applicable to each. Part II E examines
the notable places where two or more of the problems might be seen to
overlap. For instance, when government supports the religious speech of a
private speaker, it might arguably provide an undue subsidy and might
present a case marginally within the endorsement paradigm. This section
notes that the points of intersection create no real incongruity and that the
four problems and their corresponding restraining principles are essentially
separable.
Part III contains concluding remarks. In summary, it ties the four constraints to core Establishment Clause concerns and finds that, in many respects, the restraints of the Establishment Clause have expanded neither
far-nor incoherently-beyond these core issues. Finally, the article recasts
the restraints of the Establishment Clause into four legal tests that respond
sensitively to their corresponding animating concerns.

II.
A.

THE FOUR CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS IN CONTEXT

When Government Acts as Lawmaker: Principlesof Equality That
Restrain Use of Religious Classifications

When government enacts a law imposing regulatory burdens or distributing benefits, it must identify the persons or activities subject to the burden
and the persons or activities entitled to the benefits. As the cases in this
section demonstrate, the constitutional command of disestablishment presumptively forbids government from using religion as the basis for receiving
benefits or shouldering burdens. That presumption is strongest when government differentiates among religious denominations.1 4 Further, for most
matters, religious and analogous conscientious secular interests are often
said to have the same constitutional stature; thus, discrimination on the
basis of religion generally bears a heavy burden of justification. Further
still, once a plausible justification is offered to support a religious classification, the regulation that uses the classification is examined with care.

14. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, perhaps the Court's strongest proponent of the validity of

government benefits to religion generally, finds that the Establishment Clause forbids sectarian
preferences. See Wallace v. Jeffries, 472 U.S. 38, 106, 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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These controlling Establishment Clause rules can be explained by reference to principles of equality imported from the Equal Protection Clause. i"
At its center, the constitutional principle of racial equality forbids government from using race as the basis for governmental action. Government
may not hand out benefits or impose burdens on the basis of race absent a
reason of overriding importance. 6 Even then, that reason must be closely

served by the government action.'
The constitutional principles of religious equality can be seen by refer-

ence to three elemental features of the cases. A regulation is infirm if:
(1)

It purposefully employs a religious classification, either among

religions or between religion and analogous secular activity; and
(2)

it lacks a sufficiently weighty justification; or

(3) it is an insufficiently precise means toward the otherwise justified objective.
The following sections address each of these elements in turn."8
15. The Equal Protection Clause states: "No State shall... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend I.
16. The Constitution is offended even when benefits are purportedly equal. See Brown v.
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
17. Cf Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion of
O'Connor, J.) (All racial classifications, even those employed in "affirmative action" programs,
are subject to strict scrutiny, which "ensures that the means chosen 'fit' th[e] compelling goal so
closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate
racial prejudice or stereotype." To remedy societal discrimination is an insufficient justification.
To remedy the present effects of past discrimination would suffice.); id. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("In my view there is only one circumstance in which the State may act by race to 'undo the
effects of past discrimination': where that is necessary to eliminate their own maintenance of a
system of unlawful racial classification."); id at 535-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[R]ace-conscious classification designed to further remedial goals 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives in order to withstand
constitutional scrutiny." To remedy societal discrimination is a sufficient justification.); Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452-53 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (The Court's
Equal Protection analysis, in essence, seeks to determine whether a given classification has a sufficiently rational basis. Race and gender, for instance, usually do not. "The term 'rational,' of
course, includes a requirement that an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the
disadvantaged class. Thus, the word 'rational'-for me at least-includes elements of legitimacy
and neutrality that must always characterize the performance of the sovereign's duty to govern
impartially.").
18. A word on the focus of this discussion is in order. This section argues that much of the
Court's precedent can, in fact, be understood as enforcing principles of equality closely aligned
with equal protection principles. Indeed, the point of this discussion is that much Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is reasonably comprehensible if viewed this way. It is not, however the point
of this paper to evaluate the extent to which Establishment Clause principles should turn on
notions of equality, borrowed from the Fourteenth Amendment or otherwise.
For thought on the proper role of equality and the Equal Protection Clause in Establishment
Clause cases, see, eg., John H. Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the Religion Clauses, 1981 Sup.
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1. A government regulation purposefully employed a religious
classification, either among religions or between religion and
analogous secular activity.
As a threshold matter, regulation must purposefully employ a religious
classification. The classification may be explicit: On its face the law may
distinguish between religious and other activity. The classification may also
be implicit: On its face the law may appear neutral, yet a religious classification lurks in disguise. There are two types of explicit and implicit religious classifications:
Those that discriminate among religious
denominations; and those that discriminate on the basis of religion
generally. 19
Classifications that discriminate on the basis of religion generally account for all but one case in this group. A Texas law exempted certain
religious publications from state sales and use tax;2 0 section 702 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 exempts religious organizations from Title VII prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of religion;2 1 a Connecticut law
granted employees an absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath;22
a Kentucky law excluded ordained ministers from public office;2 3 and a
Massachusetts law allowed churches and schools to veto certain liquor license applications.2 4
In addition, the Court has reviewed one law that it found discriminated
among religious denominations. In Larson v. Valente,25 a Minnesota statute conditioned the right of charitable organizations to solicit funds on
CT. REv. 193; Timothy L. Hall, Religion, Equality, and Difference, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (1992);
Brownstein, supra note 13, at n. 21 (1990); Philip Kurland, Of Church and States and the Supreme
Court, 29 U. CHi. L. REv. 1 (1961); Ira C. Lupu, Where RightsBegin: The Problem of Burdenson
the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933, 982-87 (1989) [hereinafter Lupu, Where
Rights Begin]; Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution 18 CONN. L. REV. 739 (1986) [hereinafter Lupu, Keeping the Faith]; Michael A. Paulsen,
Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 612 (1986); Mark Tushnet, "OfChurch and State andthe
Supreme Court" Kurland Revisited, 1989 Sup. CT. REv. 373.
19. Presumptively, the Establishment Clause can be seen to require what has been termed
"formal neutrality." See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and DisaggregatedNeutrality
Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990). This principle, however, falls short of a complete ban on religious classifications proposed long ago by Professor Kurland. See Kurland, supra
note 18.
20. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
21. Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints Corp. v. Amos, 483

U.S. 327 (1987).
22.
23.
24.
25.

Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
456 U.S. 228 (1982).
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compliance with extensive registration and reporting requirements.2 6 The
statute exempted religious organizations, but only those that received more

than fifty percent of their contributions from members or affiliated organizations.' Justice Brennan, writing for a five-member majority, found that
the fifty percent rule was drafted precisely to include particular religions
28
and exclude others.

2.

The regulation lacks a sufficiently weighty justification.
If a regulation embodies a religious classification, the next issue becomes

whether that regulation is adequately justified. The range of sufficient justifications is an important gauge of the strength of the governing principles

of equality. For instance, because the most fundamental Establishment
Clause principle is that government may not favor one religious denomination over another, a sectarian preference may be validated only by a justifi-

cation of the highest order.2 9
The Court has never identified the strength of the government interest
required to justify a nonsectarian religious classification. This is no surprise, inasmuch as government interests have no explicit place under

Lemon. In practice, however, the Court has found only one justification
acceptable: removal of a barrier to religious exercise or a burden on reli-

gious practice.30
Most notably, in PresidingBishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Lat-

ter-Day Saints Corp. v. Amos, 3 1 the Court upheld section 702 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which exempts religious organizations from the Title
32

VII provisions prohibiting employment discrimination based on religion.

26. Id. at 230-31.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 254. The Court rejected the argument that the statute simply had a "disparate
impact" on certain sects. Rather, the law "makes explicit and deliberate distinctions between
different religious organizations," and favors established over new churches. Id. at 246-47 n.23.
Earlier statutory language was revised when legislators perceived that a Roman Catholic Archdiocese would not fit the exemption. Id. at 254.
This approach is consistent with the Court's race discrimination jurisprudence. To implicate
the Constitution, government must act on a discriminatory purpose. To show a disparate impact
on the disadvantaged group is insufficient. Government must be said to act because of, not in spite
of, the disparate effect. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
29. Larson, 456 U.S. at 246. No present Justice has challenged the idea that sectarian preferences can violate the Establishment Clause.
30. See infra notes 31-63 and accompanying text.
31. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
32. Id. at 330. Amos worked for a nonprofit gymnasium operated by two religious organizations and was fired because he was not a member of the Mormon Church. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-1 (1988).
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The Court specifically validated the purpose of "alleviat[ing] significant
governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions... [and] minimiz[ing] govern-

' 33
mental interfer[ence] with the decision-making process in religions.

Government was therefore allowed to remove a burden of its own
creation.3 4
By contrast, in McDaniel v. Paty,35 the Court struck down a Kentucky
law that excluded ordained ministers from public office. To prevent a polit-

ical rift along religious lines was an unsatisfactory justification. As Justice
Brennan said, concurring: "The establishment clause does not license government to treat religion and those who teach or practice it, simply by virtue of their status as such, as subversive of American ideals and therefore
subject to unique disabilities. '36 In sum, religion has been acceptably relevant to use a regulatory proxy only when government has sought to remove
a barrier to religious exercise or a burden on religious practice.37 On most
fronts, then, the principle of disestablishment is quite strong. Whatever can
be said of the difficulty of comparing the importance of governmental inter33. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335-36 (quotations omitted). Whether these reasons suffice to justify
the religious preference is a much more sensible inquiry than whether the preference had the
principal effect of advancing religion. In Amos, the Court avoided the literal language of the
second prong of Lemon by finding that the advancement of religion was attributable to the
church, not the government. "For a law to have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon, it must be fair
to say that the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence."
Id. at 337 (emphasis in original). The Court noted that since the gym was a nonprofit institution,
and § 702 did not allow the church to extend its influence into the commercial world, there was
no evidence that the Civil Rights Act increased the church's ability to send its religious message.
Id. Likewise, any pressure threatening discharge of an employee to join the church could not be
attributed to the government. Id. at 337-38 n.15.
34. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (construing the Federal Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988)). Under the Act, if a public secondary school maintained a "limited open forum," it could not discriminate against religious or other speech. Id. at
235. Eight Justices accepted the plurality's determination that the predominant secular purpose
of the Act was to prohibit discrimination against religious and other types of speech. Id at 242.
A majority also concluded that the act was otherwise consistent with the Constitution. Id. at 253;
see infra notes 253-58, 262 and accompanying text. See also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-46 nn.10-11 (1987) (concluding summarily that to require a state to
provide unemployment compensation benefits to an employee fired because she refused to work on
her Sabbath did not violate the Establishment Clause; rather, such a policy permissibly accommodates religious practice); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981) (summarily concluding that to compel unemployment compensation benefits be paid to a Jehovah's Witness whose
religious beliefs led him to terminate his employment did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Instead, that course demonstrated neutrality toward religious differences.).
35. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
36. Id. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring).
37. Of course, religious affiliation is, by definition, relevant when a burden is allegedly caused
by the demands of one's religion.
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ests, to protect free religious exercise is of constitutional or near constitu8
3

tional stature.

These cases thus squarely confront the legitimacy of government efforts
to facilitate or accommodate religious exercise-government efforts to reconcile religious practices with its regulatory interests, or with conflicting
demands in the world at large.3 9 How easily government can overcome the
presumption against religious classifications will depend on the latitude
government is given to afford religious exercise exceptional treatment.40 In
38. On the subject of identifying "compelling" governmental interests, see Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling GovernmentalInterests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional
Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REv.917 (1988).
39. This is often termed "accommodation" of religion. Ira Lupu has defined accommodation, in part, as: "actions taken by the state or its agents that.., respond affirmatively to religion
based claims for exceptional treatment, which would not be afforded but for the religious quality
of the claims or the religious character of the institution(s) advancing the claims." Ira C. Lupu,
Reconstructuring the Establishment Clause: The Case Against DiscretionaryAccommodation of
Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv.555, 559 (1991). He excludes from the definition actions required by
the Free Exercise Clause. While there seems to be no dispute that government must provide
exceptional treatment mandated by the Free Exercise Clause, Professor Lupu has argued that only
the judiciary is competent to afford the necessary exceptional treatment. Id. at 599-609.
After the Court's latest Free Exercise Clause decision, Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources v. Smith, 495 U.S.._., 110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990) [Smith], it seems that little, if any, exceptional treatment will be constitutionally required. In Smith, two members of the Native American
church were fired from their jobs as counselors with a private substance abuse rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote at a church ceremony. Id. at 1597. Subsequently, they
were denied state unemployment compensation benefits because they were dismissed for workrelated misconduct. Id. at 1598. When the case worked its way up to the Supreme Court for the
first time, the Court remanded for the Oregon Supreme Court to determine whether the employees' conduct violated the state's criminal drug laws. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 673-74 (1988). The Oregon Supreme Court held that the employees conduct was indeed criminal, but that the Free Exercise Clause privileged their behavior.
Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 763 P.2d 146, 148 (Or. 1988). In reviewing this decision, the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause, by its own force, does not
exempt religiously motivated acts or abstentions from the operation of a neutral, generally applicable criminal statute. Rather, the free exercise clause protects only against those government
acts that regulate "religious beliefs as such" or that seek "to ban [religiously motivated] acts or
abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious
belief that they display." Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1599.
40. The Smith decision is critically important on this point. Smith held that, by itself, the
Free Exercise Clause never compels a judicially created exemption from the incidental burdens of
a neutral, generally applicable state criminal law. Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1599. Moreover, there is
no reason to believe that Smith will be limited to state criminal laws. As a consequence, if religious exercise is to be accommodated, it will only be by legislative or executive action which
employs a religious classification.
Perhaps most significantly, Smith suggested that a legislatively crafted exemption was the appropriate way to lift burdens on religiously motivated acts and abstentions like the peyote use at
issue in that case. Id at 1606. See alsoBullock, 489 U.S. at 18, n.8 (plurality opinion of Brennan,
J.) ("[flf the Air Force provided a sufficiently broad exemption from its dress requirements for
servicemen whose religious faiths commanded them to wear certain headgear or other attire...
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doctrinal terms, the question is how much deference will the Court give to
determinations by government that a given burden on religious practice is
a sufficient justification and that the law is sufficiently well crafted toward
the elimination of that burden. In a sense, future cases will turn on the
extent to which Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause values
predominate.4 1
3.

The Regulation Is an Insufficiently Precise Means Toward the
Otherwise Justified Objective of Lifting a Burden on
Religious Exercise.

The strength of the principle of equality is also evinced in the Court's
invalidation of laws that make use of religious classifications on the grounds
that they were crafted with insufficient care; in doctrinal terms, the regulation was not narrowly tailored to the purpose of lifting a burden on free
religious exercise. Several times the Court has concluded that government
could have facilitated free religious exercise in a manner that would have
avoided the need to use the religious classification, or avoided some other
undesirable feature of the regulation.4 2 These cases thus restrict the government's latitude to depart from the norm of equality.
This tailoring requirement is readily apparent in Larson v. Valente.4 3 At
issue was a Minnesota statute that conditioned the right of charitable organizations to solicit funds on compliance with extensive registration and rethat exemption presumably would not be invalid under the establishment clause even though this
Court has not found it to be required by the free exercise clause."); id. at 29-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (A state's discretion to accommodate religion is much broader than the commands of the
Free Exercise Clause.).
41. As should be apparent, this Article does not attempt to enter the extensive debate over
the permitted scope of government accommodation of the free exercise of religion. See, e.g.,
Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 75 (1990); Ira C. Lupu, The
Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV.743 (1992); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing
the Establishment Clause, supra note 30, at n.6, 7; Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion, 1985 Sup. Cr. REV. 1; Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update
and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992); Dallin H. Oaks, Separation,
Accommodation and the Future of Church and State, 35 DEPAUL L. REv. 1 (1985); David E.
Steinberg, Religious Exemptions as Affirmative Action, 40 EMORY L.J. 77 (1991); Mark Tushnet,
The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion, 76 Gao. L.J. 1691 (1988).
42. Cf U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) (citation
omitted) ("In determining whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate, we look to several
factors, including the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; the flexibility
and duration of the relief, including the availability of waiver provisions; the relationship of the
numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and the impact of the relief on the rights of third
parties.").
43. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
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porting requirements.'
The statute exempted only those religious
organizations that received more than fifty percent of their contributions
from members or affiliated organizations.4 5 The Court found that this fifty
percent rule was a denominational preference, created for the specific purpose of including particular religions and excluding others." As such, it
violated the Establishment Clause's "clearest command: that one religious
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another."'4 7 The Court
ruled that a law which conflicts with this central principle is judged not by
Lemon, but under strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny, of course, requires that
the law be "justified by a compelling governmental interest" and be "closely
fitted to that interest."4 8 Here, even assuming the importance of the need to
protect the public against abuse in the solicitation of charitable contributions, Minnesota failed to carry its burden in proving that this purpose was
closely served by the sectarian classification.4 9
The requirement of a tight fit between means and ends explains the
decision in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,Inc.. 5 0 In Caldor,the Court invalidated a Connecticut law that granted employees an absolute right not to
work on their chosen Sabbath.5" Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, emphasized the unqualified nature of the law and concluded that it
advanced religion as prohibited by the second prong of Lemon :52
In essence, the Connecticut statute imposes on employers and
employees an absolute duty to conform their business practices to
the particular religious practices of the employee by enforcing observance of the Sabbath the employee unilaterally designates. The State
thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically control over all secular interests at the workplace; the statute takes no

44. Id. at 230-31. All charitable organizations covered by the law had to register with the
Minnesota Department of Commerce and file an annual report identifying total income, expenses
of management, fundraising, and education, and how much money went to out-of-state-recipients
and for what reason. Id at 231. In addition, the Department of Commerce was authorized to
withdraw registration if to do so would be in the public interest and if the organization engaged in
fraud or deceit. Id Further still, an organization was ineligible to maintain its registration if it
spent an unreasonable amount (presumptively 30% or more) for management, general, and fundraising costs. Id.
45. Id. at 231-32.
46. Id at 254.
47. Id at 244.
48. Id. at 252 (stating that Lemon applies when a law affords a uniform benefit to all
religions).
49. Id. at 247.
50. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
51. Id. at 708.
52. Id at 710-11.
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account of the convenience or interests of the employer or those of
other employees who do not observe a Sabbath.
There is no exception under the statute for special circumstances, such as the Friday Sabbath observer employed in an occupation with a Monday through Friday schedule-a school teacher,
for example; the statute provides for no special consideration if a
high percentage of an employer's work force asserts rights to the
same Sabbath. Moreover, there is no exception when honoring the
dictates of Sabbath observers would cause the employer substantial
economic burdens or when the employer's compliance would require
the imposition of significant burdens on other employees required to
work in place of the Sabbath observers. 3
Hence, even if the regulation was justified as one that relieves a burden
on religious exercise, the law was nevertheless constitutionally infirm because it made insufficient provision for the competing interests of the employer and other employees by imposing an undue burden upon third
parties. Consideration of the burdens placed on third parties is an ordinary
part of the tailoring requirement when an otherwise permissible racial classification is reviewed under the Equal Protection Clause. 4
The Court has also invalidated a religious classification as under-inclusive. In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,55 the Court struck down a Texas
law exempting from the Texas sales and use tax "periodicals that are published or distributed by a religious faith and that consist wholly of writings
promulgating the teaching of the faith and books that consist wholly of
writings sacred to a religious faith."5 6
Five Justices, in two opinions, concluded that the exemption offended
the Establishment Clause. However, neither opinion defines equality principles as controlling. Rather, both opinions focus on the message sent by
53. Id. at 709-10 (footnote omitted). Justice O'Connor concluded that the law had an impermissible effect because it sent a message of endorsement of Sabbath observance. Id. at 711
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor also placed emphasis on the absolute nature of the
preference, thereby distinguishing the law from a "reasonable accommodation" that would send a
message of antidiscrimination, not endorsement. Id. at 712.
54. E.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989) (plurality opinion of
Brennan, J.) (stating that burden on third parties is an important inquiry); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 196 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476

U.S. 267, 283 (1986) (Powell, J.) (reviewing court-ordered remedy for racial discrimination).
I therefore think that the distinction between the accommodation required in this case and the
accommodation demanded of employers by Title VII is defensible. Contra Lupu, Keeping the

Faith,supra note 18, at 748, 749 (This distinction "cannot bear the constitutional weight assigned
to it.).
55. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).

56. Id. at 5 (quotations omitted).
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the Texas Legislature. 7 Nevertheless, it is clear that inequality was at the
root of the constitutional violation. All five Justices recognized that a more
inclusive exemption could pass constitutional muster."3 All agreed that an
exemption that eliminated the viewpoint bias and included nonreligious organizations would be unobjectionable5 9
Larkin v. Grendel'sDen, Inc.6I can also best be understood by reference

to this tailoring requirement. In that case, the Court struck down a state
statute that gave churches, as well as schools, the power to veto applications
for liquor licenses for establishments within a 500-foot radius of the location of the church or school. The Court accepted the state's interest as one
that protects religious exercise. In other words, a state could regulate the
environs around a church to zone out inconsistent uses. 61 Nevertheless, the
veto was an unacceptable means toward this end. The Court found that
delegation of this power threatened the Murray separation of church and
state in two ways. First, exercise of the veto was subject to no standards,
and thus the power could be used not just to insulate the church from undesirable neighbors, but to forward religious goals, too.62 Second, the "appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority" formed a forbidden
symbolic link between church and state.63
Although the Court spoke in terms of advancing religion and endorsement, 64 the case is much more coherent if understood by reference to the
elements outlined in this section. The government had a satisfactory reason
to employ a religious classification. The law was nevertheless unconstitutional because government could have served this end while avoiding the
perceived constitutional evils. The Court suggested that the law's valid
objectives could be accommodated by other means, such as "an absolute
legislative ban on liquor outlets within reasonable prescribed distances from
57. See id. at 15 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (focusing on a message of endorsement and sponsorship sent by the exemption); id. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (focusing on endorsement).
58. Cf Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating over-inclusive
classification).
59. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15-16 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
60. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
61. Specifically, the Court stated:
[S]chools and churches have a valid interest in being insulated from certain kinds of commercial establishments, including those dispensing liquor. Zoning laws have long been
employed to this end, and there can be little doubt about the power of a state to regulate
the environment in the vicinity of schools, churches, hospitals, and the like by exercise of
reasonable zoning law.
Id. at 121.
62. Id. at 125.
63. IdL at 125-26.
64. Ideat 125.
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churches, schools, hospitals, and like institutions, or by ensuring a hearing
for the views of affected institutions at licensing proceedings. ' 65
B.

When Government Acts as Financier: ProhibitedSubsidies

The Court has long viewed an unrestricted financial subsidy to a church
as forbidden, even if the subsidy were available to all churches. Hence, a
city cannot give $100,000 to the local Roman Catholic Parish or $10,000 to
all local churches. 66 This is true even if the city claims it is motivated entirely by a desire to forward the churches' secular humanitarian aims. 67 As
a doctrinal matter, the principles of equality evinced in the cases in the
foregoing group would serve to invalidate aid reserved for religion, without
regard to the nature of the benefit provided.
The Court has also long believed that an unequal subsidy is not the only
prohibited kind of subsidy. Rather, some forms of "direct" and "substantial" aid to religion have been deemed unconstitutional. The cases suggest
that the Establishment Clause contains a ban on all "direct" government
assistance used by its recipient specifically to sustain religious activity.6 8 In
addition, some "indirect" assistance can be unconstitutionally substantial:
The cases suggest that there is a limit past which government cannot underwrite the secular costs of operating an organization with both secular and
religious purposes.6 9 The Constitution thus prohibits two types of religious
subsidies: those that specifically underwrite religious activity, and those that
more generally and broadly support a religious organization. 70 There is no
65. Id. at 124 (footnotes omitted).
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Amos also illustrates the tailoring requirement at
work in these cases. Although not at issue in Amos, Justices Brennan and Marshall argued that all
secular activities of religious employers cannot be exempted from Title VII's prohibition against
religious discrimination. An individual's freedom of conscience is threatened when government
allows employers to require employees to choose between religious beliefs and a job. The autonomy of religious organizations, however, is threatened when they cannot order their affairs. An
organization's interests outweigh an individual's with regard to the religious activities of religious
organizations, but not with regard to secular activities. In sum, as to a religious employer's secular activities, the burden on third parties is too great to justify an exemption.

66. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
67. See School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985).
68. The Court has maintained that "the [Establishment] Clause ...

absolutely prohibit[s]

government-financed or government sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular reli-

gious faith." Id. at 385 (citations omitted).
69. The Court has further maintained that "the Establishment Clause prohibits forms of aid
that provide direct and substantial advancement of the sectarian enterprise." Id. at 396 (citation

omitted).
70. There has been substantial agreement among members of the Court that the Establish-

ment Clause has been read to contain these prohibitions. See id. at 399-400 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see infra notes 73, 82-83, 105 and accompanying text
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dispute that churches may benefit, like any member of the public, from
many generally available government services. Religion may enjoy at least
some "incidental" benefits like anyone else.7 1 Therefore, a city need not
exclude a church from city fire or police protection. This is true even
though a church's purely religious aims are more easily advanced when it
need not divert effort from the saving of souls to the prevention of fires.7 2
The problem, of course, is that not every constitutionally permissible
benefit necessarily is analogous to fire protection and not every unconstitutional benefit necessarily appears as a donation. Nonetheless, the constitutional restraints can be most sensibly understood if viewed as attempts to
guard against religious offerings by government.7 3 Viewed this way, it is
less surprising that the proscriptions against undue subsidies have found
force in rather confined circumstances. Indeed, despite the Court's articulation of dual proscriptions, a constitutional violation has always involved
direct support for specifically religious activity.74 The cases in this group
that find a constitutional violation share three traits:

(1)
(2)

A subsidy;
which directly underwrites specifically religious activity;

5

and

("Nothing in the record indicates that Shared Time instructors have attempted to proselytize their
students... [or] that the perceived or actual effect of the Shared Time program will be to inculcate religion at public expense ....
[However,] the [Community Education] program has the
perceived and actual effect of advancing the religious aims of the church-related schools."); id. at
401 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Not one instance of attempted religious inculcation exists in the
records of the school-aid cases decided today.... ."); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409 (1985)
(majority opinion of Brennan, J.) (Excessive entanglement resulted from attempts to prevent government assistance "from being used, intentionally or unwittingly, to inculcate the religious beliefs
of the surrounding parochial school.") id. at 423-24 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (apparently accepting that Ball identified the relevant constitutional injuries).
71. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 393.
72. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18.
73. An offering is "a contribution to the support of a church." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983).
74. Michael W. McConnell has described these cases as giving "taxpayers... a constitutional
right to insist that none of their taxes be used for religious purposes." Michael W. McConnell,
Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 183-85 (1992). He believes that,
instead, a taxpayer should have "a right to insist that the government not give tax dollars to
religion qua religion, or in a way that favors religion over nonreigion, or one religion over another. But the taxpayer has no right to insist that the government discriminate against religion in
the distribution of public funds." Id. at 185-86. Professor McConnell's vision is actually very
close to the existing state of the law.
75. By religious activity I mean some act that is intrinsically religious. That is, by its nature
it "relate[s] to or manifest[s] faithful devotion to an acknowledged ultimate reality or deity."
WEBSTR's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983).
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(3) which can fairly be attributed to a government decision to subsidize the specifically religious activity. 6
Similarly, the government can defend the programs at issue in ways which
attempt to negate the existence of one or more of these elements.
1. A subsidy.
The benefit at issue in these cases is "a grant or gift of money," or some
other support.7 7 In this group of cases, the government acts as benefactor,
patron, proprietor, or financier. The benefit to religion in these cases is
financial aid. If there is a constitutional transgression, it is in the sustenance of religion. These cases do not involve government as regulator because the purported illicit benefit is not that religion gets to operate under
more favorable rules of behavior.78
This distinction captures an important point. If a legal standard allows
one group to operate under more favorable rules of behavior, that kind of
advantage is sensibly addressed by the principles of equality developed in
the first group of cases. The notions of subsidy developed here, however, go
beyond a prohibition against inequality. These cases disallow certain subsidies even if everyone is subject to the same rules. While the distinction may
not always be crystal clear, these cases are not difficult to classify: All
76. Again, I should make clear that this discussion strives to present a clear picture of constitutional constraints as they have existed throughout the Lemon era. It does not intend to enter
the ample debate over the extent to which religion ought to be allowed to participate in public
programs aimed at secular objectives. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 208-14 (1992); see also Michael W. McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions: Unrecognized Implications for the Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 255 (1989) (The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions requires that religion be allowed to
participate equally in government programs.).
77. See id.; see also Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14 ("Every tax exemption constitutes a subsidy .... ").
78. This is why, for instance, the mere coincidence of religious and secular regulatory interests is constitutionally unobjectionable. For example, in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980),
the Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the Hyde Amendment, which restricts
the use of Medicaid funds to pay for abortions. The Court stated that:
[A] statute [does not] violate [ ] the Establishment Clause because it "happens to coincide
or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions." That the Judaeo-Christian religions
oppose stealing does not mean that a State or the Federal Government may not, consistent
with the Establishment Clause, enact law prohibiting larceny.
Id. at 319 (citation omitted).
In Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 577 (1983), the Court upheld an IRS
construction of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code that denied tax exempt status to
schools that discriminate in admissions on the basis of race. Id. The Court dismissed out-of-hand
the argument that the denial preferred some religions over others in violation of the Establishment
Clause. Id. The court found this to be a policy which happens to coincide with the tenets of only
some religions. Id. at 604 n.30; see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 613 (1988).
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plainly involved the government as benefactor, patron, proprietor, or financier, and financial aid or analogous tangible assistance.7 9
2.

That directly underwrites specifically religious activity.

Direct aid to specific religious activity has meant two different things.
On the one hand, it has meant:
(i) Benefits flowed to pervasively sectarian religious organizations;
and
(ii) the benefits either consisted of direct financial aid or were to be
used in direct support of religious activities.
On the other hand, if a program serves secular objectives and involves

predominantly secular beneficiaries, the Court has upheld financial aid be
restricted to a religiously affiliated recipient's secular activities, a significantly less stringent constitutional restraint.
(i) Program benefitsflowed to pervasively sectarianreligious organizations.

When the Court has said "pervasively sectarian" organization, it has
almost always meant a religiously affiliated primary or secondary school.

The Court has long viewed that, for most such schools, attempts to inculcate religious doctrine permeate their educational and other functions. In
other words, religious activity pervades the schools' secular activities.8 0
79. See infra notes 106-21, and accompanying text.

80. For instance:
The schools of course vary from one another, but substantial evidence suggests that they
share deep religious purposes. For instance, the Parent Handbook of one Catholic school
states the goals of Catholic education as "[a] God oriented environment which permeates
the total educational program," "[a] Christian atmosphere which guides and encourages
participation in the church's commitment to social justice," and "[a] continuous development of knowledge of the Catholic faith, its traditions, teachings and theology.".... A
policy statement of the Christian schools similarly proclaims that "it is not sufficient that
the teachings of Christianity be a separate subject in the curriculum, but the Word of God
must be an all-pervadingforce in the educationalprogram.".... These Christian schools
require all parents seeking to enroll their children either to subscribe to a particular doctrinal statement. The District Court found that the schools are "pervasively sectarian," and
concluded "without hesitation that the purposes of these schools is to advance their particular religions," and that a "substantial portion of their functions are subsumed in the religious mission."
School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 379 (1985) (citations omitted). The Court agreed with the
district court's conclusion because:
At the religious schools here-as at the sectarian schools that have been the subject of our
past cases--"the secular education those schools provide goes hand in hand with the religious mission that is the only reason for the schools' existence. Within that institution, the
two are inextricably intertwined."
Id. at 384 (citations omitted); see also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975) ("[C]hurchrelated elementary and secondary schools... typify... religion-pervasive institutions. The very
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The impact of these characterizations has been of critical importance be-

cause they equate such schools with churches and equate their educational
functions with religious functions. Thus, by definition, aid to such schools
is aid to a church, and support for pedagogy is support for religious

indoctrination."'
(ii) The benefits either consisted of directfinancialaid, or otherwise
might conceivably be used in the direct support of religious activity
The Court has concluded that religious indoctrination permeates the educational activities of religiously affiliated primary and secondary schools.
To channel aid solely to the secular functions of sectarian schools is therefore an exacting task. Small differences in the form of aid have meant un-

constitutional support for proselytizing in one case but not the next. Thus,
to determine where the constitutional boundaries have been set, one must
examine the programs at issue. Because the form of aid can be outcome
determinative, the cases are grouped on that basis.
(a) Tuition grants and tax deductions
In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,8 2 the
Court invalidated provisions of a New York law that created grants and
purpose of many of those schools is to provide an integrated secular and religious education; the
teaching process is, to a large extent, devoted to the inculcation of religious values and belief.").
But see Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 631-32 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (pervasively
sectarian institution means more than just parochial schools).
81. Much of this section argues that, outside the context of aid to religiously affiliated primary and secondary schools, the constitutional proscription against religious subsidies has had
little impact. Moreover, this section argues that, despite the often-criticized distinctions between
permissible and impermissible aid in the church school cases, the doctrine is quite coherent, if one
accepts the Court's conclusions that parochial schools are indistinguishable from churches and
religious education and proselytizing are inseparable. See John Garvey, Another Way of Looking
at School Aid, 1985 Sup. Cr. REV.61 (by reference to Title IX, establishment clause restrictions
on aid to parochial schools is essentially cogent). Nor is this to say that an unavoidable subsidy to
parochial education cannot be justified by reference to some countervailing policy. See infra part
II E. See also Michael W. McConnell, The Selective FundingProblem. Abortions and Religious
Schools, 104 HARV. L. RaV. 989 (1991).
For academic literature on church school funding, see, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to ParochialSchools-An Update, 75 CAL. L. REV. 5 (1987); Jesse H.
Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to the ParochialSchools, 56 CAL. L. REv. 260 (1968)
(Aid to parochial schools is constitutional unless there is "a purpose to aid religion" and an "effect
that meaningfully endangers religious liberty." The second prong is not satisfied if the value of
secular education services exceeds the amount of the aid.); Eric J. Segall, ParochialSchool Aid
Revisited: The Lemon Test, The Endorsement Test, and Religious Liberty, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
263 (1991) (arguing that under a "religious liberty" standard "religiously neutral" parochial
school aid programs do not violate the establishment clause).
82. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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income tax deductions to help offset sectarian school tuition.8 3 Clearly, unrestricted payments directly to the school would be unconstitutional because they could be used for sectarian purposes. The Court concluded that
"[i]n the absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that the state aid
derived from public funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and
nonideological purposes, it is clear... that direct aid in whatever form is
invalid." 4 To channel money through a tax deduction limited to parents of
sectarian school children does not make a difference.85 The same day Nyquist was decided, the Court invalidated a Pennsylvania law that provided
funds to reimburse parents of a portion of private school tuition.86
(b) Restricted grants
In Nyquist, 7 the Court also invalidated provisions of a New York law
that authorized grants to sectarian schools for the "maintenance and repair
of school facilities and equipment." 8 8 Because the maintenance and repair
payments were not, and could not be, restricted to facilities "used exclusively for secular purposes,"8 9 these payments impermissibly "subsidize[d]
directly the religious activities of sectarian elementary and secondary
schools." 9

Similarly, in Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty,91 the Court invalidated a New York law under which sectarian schools
were given lump sum payments to defray the costs of student examinations
required by law, including both state prepared and teacher prepared tests.9 2
The state could not assure that teacher prepared tests were not being used
for religious indoctrination and could not allocate costs between secular and
nonsecular uses. 3 As a result, the Court struck down the entire payment to
sectarian schools. 94
83. Id. at 764-67.
84. Id at 780.
85. Id. at 781-88, 790-91; see also Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 828 (1970).

86. Id. Parents received $75 for each student in elementary school and $150 for each in
secondary school up to the amount of tuition paid. Id

87. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
88. Id. at 762. The grants went to schools serving a high concentration of students from low
income families and were made on a per-student basis. Id. at 763.

89. Id. at 774.
90. Id.
91. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
92. Id at 480. Specifically, the state reimbursed the expenses incurred by private schools to
administer, grade, compile, and report test results. Id. at 474.
93. Id. at 477.
94. Id at 482.
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However, in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Re-

gan,9" the Court upheld a successor New York law designed to cure the

infirmities identified in Levitt. The new law eliminated reimbursement for
teacher prepared tests and audited payments to ensure that only actual
costs of secular services were reimbursed.9 6
(c) In-kind support
In-kind support has engendered the finest, and least defensible, distinctions. In each case, the Court has examined the assistance to decide
whether it entails an unacceptable risk of use during an indoctrinating moment. Given the Court's view that religious indoctrination permeates the
activities of parochial schools, it has proven difficult to channel aid solely to
secular activities. These types of aid have been invalidated:
(1) Counseling by public school employees in sectarian schools; 97
(2) remedial and accelerated instruction by public school employees in sectarian schools;98
(3) loan of instructional materials and equipment; 99
(4) field trip transportation and services similar to those provided
to public school students;" °°
(5) supplemental classes taught by public school teachers in sectarian schools during the school day;1 1 and
95. 444 U.S. 646, 657 (1980).
96. Id. at 652; see also New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977) (invalidating a
New York law under which reimbursement would be made for such services rendered between the
passage of the law at issue in Levitt and declared it unconstitutional).
97. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 353 (1975).
98. Id. at 367-72.
99. Id at 354-55. Instructional materials included maps, charts, sound recordings, films, periodicals, photographs, and so forth. Id. at 355. The loan was in-kind because:
[Given] the substantial amounts of direct support authorized by [the statute], it would
simply ignore reality to attempt to separate secular educational functions from the
predominantly religious role performed by many of Pennsylvania's church-related elementary and secondary schools and to then characterize [the loan of instructional materials] as
channeling aid to the secular without providing direct aid to the sectarian. Even though
earmarked for secular purposes, "when it flows to an institution in which religion is so
pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission,"
state aid has the impermissible primary effect of advancing religion....
Substantial aid to the education function of [these pervasively sectarian] schools, accordingly, necessarily results in aid to the sectarian school enterprise as a whole.
Id. at 365-66 (citations omitted); see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
100. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 252-55.
101. Ball, 473 U.S. at 376-79. This "Shared Time" program attempted to supplement the
curriculum in nonpublic schools with classes taught during the regular school day by full-time
public school teachers. Id. The classes were held in space leased from the nonpublic schools and
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(6)

supplemental classes taught by sectarian school teachers after

school. 102
In the Court's words, invalid programs offer the "kind of direct aid to the

educational function of the religious school [that] is indistinguishable from
school that is most
the provision of a direct cash subsidy to the religious
10 3
Clause."
Establishment
the
under
prohibited
clearly
However, several types of in-kind aid have been upheld:
(1) Textbook loans;"

(2) standardized test and scoring services, as used in public
schools; 0 5
(3)

speech and hearing diagnosis and treatment, and psychological

diagnosis, by public employees on the premises of sectarian
schools;10 6 and
(4) therapeutic, guidance, and remedial services by public employcenters, or mobile units loees, but only in public schools, public
07
cated off sectarian school grounds.1
stripped of religious imagery, and used materials provided by the public schools. Id The average
nonpublic school student spent 10% of a school day in a Shared Time class. Id at 375.
102. Id at 376-79. These "Community Education" classes were held after school and were
almost always taught by a full-time teacher from that school paid by the public schools to teach a
community education course. Id
The Court found that both the Shared Time and Community Education programs presented
an unacceptable risk that government paid teachers might intersperse their secular subjects with
the religious doctrine of the non-public schools in which they taught. Id at 387-88. The Court
stated that:
[T]here is a substantial risk that, overtly or subtly, the religious message [the Community
Education instructors] are expected to convey during the regular school day will infuse the
supposedly secular classes they teach after school. [The Shared Time teachers] may well
subtly (or overtly) conform their instruction to the environment in which they teach, while
students will perceive the instruction provided in the context of the dominantly religious
message of the institution, thus reinforcing the indoctrinating effect.... [Thus] there is a
"substantial risk" that programs operating in this environment would "be used for religious education purposes."
Id at 387-88 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 395. In other words, "the programs in effect subsidize the religious functions of
the parochial schools by taking over a substantial portion of their responsibility for teaching secular subjects." Id. at 397; see also Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 777.
104. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 233; Meek, 421 U.S. at 359-62; Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968).
105. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 233.

106. Id. at 241-44.
107. Id. at 244-48.
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(iii) Benefits to religious organizationsnot pervasively sectarian must be
restrictedto secular activities
The constitutional restriction at work in these cases reads like those articulated in the sectarian school decisions: Government may not provide a
direct subsidy to a specifically religious activity. Instead, aid must be restricted to a religiously affiliated recipient's secular activities. However,
here the organizations have not been characterized as pervasively sectarian.
Given this, the constitutional standard has been far easier to satisfy. In
practice, the Court has upheld substantial financial subsidies to religious
organizations when accompanied by restrictions against religious use.
In Tilton v. Richardson,10 8 the Court upheld aid to church-affiliated colleges and universities under Title I of the Higher Education and Facilities
Act of 1963. Title I provided construction funds "for buildings and facilities used exclusively for secular educational purposes."' 10 9 The plurality
found no basis in the record to conclude "that religion so permeates the
secular education provided by church-related colleges and universities that
their religious and secular educational functions are in fact inseparable."' 1 0
The Court struck down, however, that portion of Title I that allowed its
religious use prohibition to lapse after twenty years. The Court concluded
that "[t]he restrictive obligations of a recipient institution [not to use the
facility for sectarian instruction or worship] cannot, compatibly with the
Religion Clauses, expire while the building has substantial value." 11 1 Similarly, in Hunt v. McNair,"2 the Court upheld a South Carolina statute
under which a state-created authority would issue revenue bonds to finance
13
projects by colleges and universities, including church-affiliated ones.1
The statute forbade financing for "any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious worship .... I" These use restrictions, and the fact that the religiously-affiliated institutions involved in the
case were not pervasively sectarian, avoided any unconstitutional effect."'

108. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
109. Id. at 674-75.

110. Id. at 680. "There is no evidence that religion seeps into the use of any of theE] facilities
funded under Title I. Id. at 681.
111. Id. at 683. The Court has since characterized this holding as simply negating a sugges-

.."

tion that constitutional restrictions can expire, not as requiring that statutes contain express restrictions. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 614.

112. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
113. Id. at 738.
114. Id. at 736.
115. Id. at 744-45.
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In Roemer v. Board of Public Works,1 16 the challenged Maryland statutory program offered general grants to private colleges, including religiously
affiliated institutions. For each full-time student at a private college, the
grants equaled fifteen percent of the money the state spent per pupil in the
state college system. The program forbade money for "sectarian purposes,"
and did not extend to institutions which primarily awarded seminary or
theological degrees.11 7 The plurality accepted the district court's finding
that the church-affiliated colleges involved in the case were not "pervasively
sectarian" and therefore were not forbidden categorically from receiving
state aid.' 18 The statutory prohibition against use of the funds for sectarian
purposes was therefore a sufficient constitutional guard. 119
3. The subsidy can fairly be attributed to a government decision to
subsidize the specifically religious activity
The paradigmatic constitutional violation occurs when government
places a check into a church offering plate. But just because a check ends
up in the plate does not mean the government put it there:
[T]he Establishment Clause is not violated every time money previously in the possession of a State is conveyed to a religious institution. For example, a State may issue a paycheck to one of its
employees, who may then donate all or part of that paycheck to a
religious institution, all without constitutional barrier; and the State
may do so even knowing that the employee so intends to dispose of
120
his salary.
In such an instance, the offering cannot be fairly attributed to the government. As suggested by this example, intervening third-party action can be
of decisive importance.
In at least two circumstances, however, government can fairly be said to
have made a choice to subsidize the religious activity:
(i) When the program itself was directed to support the religious
activities of religious groups; or
(ii) when government failed to employ restrictions to avoid direct
support of religious activity, at least to the extent consistent with the
program's ends.
The following sections examine the subsidy cases in light of these concepts
of fair attribution.

116. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
117. Id. at 740-42 and n.3.
118. Id. at 758.

119. Id. at 760-61.
120. Whitters v. Washington Dept. of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486-87 (1986).
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(i) The program itself was directed to subsidize the religious activities of
religious groups
Recall that the Court in the past has characterized religiously affiliated
primary and secondary schools as "pervasively sectarian" religious organizations. As such, attempts to inculcate religious doctrine permeate their
educational and other functions. Thus, these schools are the legal
equivalent of churches, and their educational functions are inseparably
joined with proselytizing. Thus, by definition, aid to such schools is aid to a
church, and support for pedagogy is support for religious indoctrination.1 2 1
Moreover, in every instance that the Court has invalidated a program, a gigantic percentage of program benefits was received by sectarian secondary
122

schools.

Based on the foregoing, programs designed chiefly to benefit church
schools can be seen as government assistance targeted at the religious activities of religious organizations which, as an incidental matter, might benefit
their secular activities and secular groups. Viewed this way, there is no
question that the subsidy can be fairly attributed to government. If one
accepts the fact that religious indoctrination is inseparable from the educational functions of church schools, a program that mainly benefits church
schools raises a strong inference that government sought to subsidize religious activity.
(ii) Government failed to employ restrictionsto avoid direct subsidy of
religious activity, at least to the extent consistent with the
program's ends
The starting premise is that government may not direct a subsidy to
religious activity or, in other words, the government may not make a donation to a church. When a program is defended as providing aid in pursuit
of a secular goal, the question of fair attribution can become complicated.
Still, some fair attribution issues are clear and uncomplicated. For instance,
to choose religious means to effect a secular objective when secular alternatives are available would make any religious subsidy fairly attributable to

121. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 84-104 and accompanying text. In Ball, 473 U.S. at 379, 40 of 41 recipients of program benefits were sectarian schools; in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 234 (1974),
691 of 720 were sectarian schools; in Meek, 421 U.S. at 364, 75% were church-related schools; in
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 830 (1973), over 90% were church-run schools; and in Nyquist, 413
U.S. at 768 n.23, 1748 of 2038 beneficiaries were religiously affiliated primary and secondary
schools.
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the government.1 23 To choose religious over secular means evinces a decision to embrace the peculiarly religious aspects inherent in the means. In
other words, it evinces a decision to support the activity because of its peculiarly religious features.
In the same vein, a program aimed at secular objectives might guard
against direct support of religious activity. If it does, it might thereby nullify a conclusion that an incidental religious subsidy could be fairly attribu-

table to government.124 At the least, avoidable subsidies can fairly be
125
attributed to the government.
Attribution may not be fair in two key circumstances. One, if the principal objectives of the program would be frustrated by restrictions that
sought to avoid the provision of program benefits to religious activity. Two,
if some benefits under a broad program happened also to fall to pervasively
sectarian organizations. In either circumstance, the subsidy might be said
to be an unavoidable consequence of the program. Unavoidable, that is,
unless government singles out religious recipients for exclusion.
Stated another way, government sometimes might decide to go forward
with a program notwithstanding the prospect that religious activity would

thereby receive a subsidy. In some cases government can be said act in spite
of the subsidy it will give to religion. Then the question would remain
6
2
whether such subsidy are nevertheless unconstitutional.1

(iii) Intervening choices of third-parties

Sometimes, the decision to confer a benefit on a religious organization
can be attributed to a third party and not the government. Two subsidy

cases were decided on the basis that third party involvement served to forestall constitutional difficulty. In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 27 the Court found no difference between direct
123. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 618 (1989) (Where the government's
secular message can be conveyed by two symbols, only one of which carries religious meaning, an
observer reasonably might infer from the fact that the government has chosen to use the religious
symbol that the government means to promote religious faith.).
124. The cases which involved aid to religious higher education serve to illustrate. Consider
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), see supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text, and
Title I's religious use restriction. Consider also Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736
(1976); see supra notes 118-121 and accompanying text, and its state-law requirement that aid
recipients use funds only for secular purposes. In neither case were program goals compromised
by government's efforts to avoid giving a subsidy to religious activity. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 754;
Tilton, 403 U.S. at 678. In both cases the programs sought to support private higher education.
125. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 641 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Government
cannot employ "religion because of its unique appeal to a higher authority.").
126. See infra notes 275-82 and accompanying text.
127. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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payments to sectarian schools and grants and tax deductions afforded parents of sectarian school children. 12 By contrast, in Mueller v. Allen, 29 the
Court upheld a Minnesota tax deduction for expenses incurred for elementary and secondary school tuition, texts, and transportation. The Court
found these factors negated a constitutional violation: It was one of many
available tax deductions; the deduction was available for educational expenses incurred by all parents, including those whose children attended
public schools; and sectarian schools benefitted from the deduction only as
a result of individual, private choices. Nyquist was distinguished because
the deduction was based on expenses and applied to all schools, public and
parochial. 3 ' In short, the Constitution allowed the "attenuated financial
benefit, ultimately controlled by the private choices of individual parents,
that eventually flow[ed] to parochial schools from the neutrally available
tax benefit."''
Most recently, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind,1 32 the Court unanimously upheld a Washington state program providing aid to blind students, under which Witters applied to receive vocational rehabilitation aid. The aid would ultimately go to a private Christian
college where Witters was studying for a career in religious service.' 33 The
majority found that the aid could not be attributed to the government. Aid
128. Id. at 783-87, 790-91; see also Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 828 (1973) (tuition reimbursement plan).
129. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
130. Id. at 398-99.
131. Id. at 400. The four dissenters found Nyquist controlling and identified these constitutional injuries:
There can be little doubt that the State of Minnesota intended to provide, and has
provided, "[s]ubstantial aid to the educational function of [church-related] schools," and
that the tax deduction for tuition and other education expenses "necessarily results in aid
to the sectarian school enterprise as a whole ....9
[Flor the first time, the Court has upheld financial support for religious schools without
any reason at all to assume that the support will be restricted to the secular functions of
those schools and will not be used to support religious instruction.
Id. at 416-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Putting aside whether it ought to negate a constitutional
violation, I think the idea of fair attribution explains the difference between these two decisions
better than alternative theories. Professor Lupu has identified two competing explanations. First,
benefits to religious institutions create an inference of nonsecular purpose, while benefits to individuals do not. I find it far likelier that government's purpose in either case is to benefit religious
education. Second, and the explanation that Professor Lupu prefers, is that aid to individualsrather than institutions-prevents capture of resources by more entrenched religious groups. See
Lupu, Keeping the Faith, supra note 18, at 752-53. However, I see little economic difference
between a group which forms a school and applies for aid, and a group which forms a school and
whose members then receive a tax deduction at year's end.
132. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
133. Id. at 483.
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is paid directly to the student, and the decision to use their aid for religious
134
education is truly the result of private choice:
Washington's program is... inno way skewed toward religion. It is
not one of "the ingenious plans for channeling state aid to sectarian
schools that periodically reach this court[.]"... It creates no financial incentive for students to undertake sectarian education .... In
this case, the fact that aid goes to individuals means that the decision
to support religious education is made by the individual, not by the
13 5
State.
C.

Government Speech with a Religious Message: The Restraining
Principles of Endorsement

Assume that a city has these words printed on the top of each page of
city correspondence: "Offer up your devotions to God your Creator, and
his Son Jesus Christ, the Redeemer of the world!"' 136 Assume further that to
do so raises a constitutional issue, even if the message costs the city nothing,
and even if it is constitutional for coins to read "In God We Trust." Resolution of the question would turn on the extent to which government may
engage in religious speech.
The cases in this group impose limits on religious exhortations attributable to government. They share three salient traits:
(1) The activity in question was in its essence expressive;
(2) government gave its approval to the specific message sent by
the expressive activity; and
(3) a reasonable observer would receive a message from government that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or
37
preferred.'
The first element is of importance because the constitutional restraints
imposed by these cases can be sensibly understood if they are seen as limits
on expression and not as the application of a general constitutional standard
in the specific context of expressive activity. The second element is likewise
134. Id. at 487.
135. Id. at 487-88 (footnotes and citations omitted).
136. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 607 (1989).
137. This is the essence of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test, which obviously underlies
the constitutional proscription outlined in this section. Whether this is the meaning of endorsement in all contexts, the cases to evaluate religious speech have used endorsement to mean favoritism or preference.
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critical. The limits are on government expression.1 38 The second element
therefore requires that government can fairly be said to have given its support to the particular message. The third element resides at the center of

the constitutional problem: whether the message, in its context, was objectionably religious. Although phrased in broad terms, the third element has
consistently turned on four factors: the force of the religious message; the
extent to which government was identified with the message; the audience
1 39
to whom it was directed; and other, contextual factors, such as history.
The cases in this group conclude that the Establishment Clause, at least
in some circumstances, forbids government from espousing a religious
message and that there are constitutional limits on government's ability to
make a religious statement. If this is so, when government sends or selectively facilitates a particular message that has a religious component, it is
entirely appropriate to focus on the message. Indeed, passing the message,
under nearly any standard, is unavoidable. For instance to determine
whether government has sent any religious message is not a question different in kind from determining whether government has sent an objectionably
strong one. The placement on the spectrum is merely different." Thus,
the court cannot avoid evaluating, case by case, the religious content of
138. See generally Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the FirstAmendment, 57 TEX. L. REv. 863, 875-76 (1979).
For scholarly treatment of Justice O'Connor's endorsement approach, see, e.g., Donald L.
Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151 (1987); Joseph Richard Hurt, The Use of Endorsement in Establishment Clause Analysis: The Key to a New Consensus, 8 MIss. COLL. L. REv. 1
(1987); Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1071
(1986); William P. Marshall, "We Know It W1hen We See It. The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 CAL. L. REv. 495 (1986); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions,and DoctrinalIllusions:
Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266 (1987). Except
for Steven Smith's article, all these commentators argue for an expansion of Justice O'Connor's
endorsement inquiry into a broader, generally applicable standard, a position with which I
strongly disagree.
139. Once again, I wish to note that his discussion should not be construed to suggest that I
find this approach optimal. Nor, for that matter, should it be construed to suggest that I find it
unacceptable. Rather, my point is that the Court's approach, properly confined, is essentially
cogent. Contra Smith, supra note 138.
140. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by PrivateSpeakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 6-9 (1986) ("[T]he Establishment Clause
absolutely disables the government from taking a position for or against religion.... [Thus]
). However, this approach is
government should not put "In God We Trust" on coins....
complicated by the fact that to root out a mild religious message which has been in place for a
very long time may send an anti-religious message. See Conkle, supra note 13.
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government speech, absent a rule that government is free to send any

message it likes. 141
1. The activity in question was in its essence expressive
This element highlights that limits in this context area are limits on
speech.142 Whatever definitional difficulties might be anticipated, the cases
have raised almost no problems. Two cases involved audible public group
prayer. 14 3 Two of the other five concerned holiday displays which included
religious symbols. 1" Axiomatically, audible public group prayer is speech.
Likewise, symbolic displays, by definition, are communicative activity. The
final case involved display of religious text. 145 Again, the essentially expressive quality is easy to see. To post the Ten Commandments in a school
46
is an activity that is fundamentally communicative.
2.

Government gave its approval to the specific message sent by the
expressive activity

Specific government approval has meant one of two things:
(i) Government sent the message; or
(ii) government selectively facilitated the message, such as where
government was responsible for the speaker's access to the audience.
Most plainly, government signals its specific approval of a message if its
officers, agents, or employees, acting on behalf of the government, choose to
send a particular message themselves. Government may also demonstrate
its approval when it facilitates selectively the messages of others; for instance, when government can afford a speaker special access to an audience.
Whenever government selectively lends its voice or resources to a particular
activity, government expresses its approval and has made a choice in favor
of that activity."4
141. Once again, I wish to note that this discussion should not be construed to suggest that I
find this approach optimal. Nor, for that matter, should it be construed to suggest that I find it
unacceptable. Rather, my point is that the Court's approach, properly confined, is essentially
cogent. Contra Smith, supra note 138.
142. For these purposes only, an act of religious worship or celebration is essentially
expressive.
143. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2649 (1992); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
144. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
145. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
146. The essentially expressive nature of the activities at issue can also be seen in the purported secular purposes and effects offered when the activities were challenged. Typical attempts
include the assertion that government was merely trying to accommodate a religious group or
acknowledge the religious practices of some of its citizens. See Lynch at 681.
147. Government does not selectively accommodate or selectively and kindly acknowledge
activities it does not wish to encourage. The reason a city neither constructs an annual display to

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:903

Focusing on the first element, the cases have raised no definitional
problems. Twice government chose the speaker for a government-sponsored event and helped to craft the message. 14 Three times government
participated in the erection of a holiday display, two of which were on government property 149 and one that was not.1 50 Once, government posted
5
religious text in public school classrooms.' '
Thus, in all the cases in this group, government has clearly made a specific decision to send or back the message at issue.15 2 The issue has not been
whether the message is one that government did choose to support. Rather,
the issue has been whether the message is one that government may choose
to support. More precisely, the determinative issue, addressed by element
three, has been whether the message communicated the thought that government favored religion or a particular religious belief.
3. A reasonable observer would receive the message that government
endorsed religion
It is this element that establishes the constitutional boundaries. Sometimes the Court has found a government-supported message that has a religious component consistent with the Constitution. Sometimes it has not.
Predictably, differentiating objectionable messages from unobjectionable
ones has engendered the most controversy. It is over this element that the
53
Court has fractured.
Four factors nevertheless emerge as controlling. The first is the strength
and clarity of the religious message. Marked, narrowly sectarian messages
stand on one extreme and mild, denominationally generous messages on the
other. The second factor is the extent to which government is perceived to
celebrate fornication nor allows private citizens to do so on the steps of the capitol is not because

such a display would fail to coincide with the "beliefs and practices of many of its citizens." See
Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
148. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2649 (Government chose a religious speaker to give an invocation at
public school graduation ceremonies under government prepared guidelines as to the form of the
prayers). Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (Government employed a legislative chaplain
who opened each legislative session with prayer, again under government guidelines as to the form
of prayer.).
149. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573 (1989) (evaluating two holiday displays).
150. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
151. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
152. Government cannot be said to give its approval to all specific messages expressed in a
public forum. See infra notes 258-81 and accompanying text (discussing access to a public forum
for religious speaker). See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
153. At present, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, appear ready to
remove all, or nearly all, limits on religious speech by government. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2684
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that speech alone could never violate the Establishment Clause).
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stand behind the statement. A third inquiry centers on the identity of the
audience and the extent to which the audience is obliged to listen. Finally,
other, contextual factors, such as history, can provide mitigating
54
influences.
In broad view, the Court has exercised notable vigilance against
messages that school children must hear, or worse, must participate in expressing.1 55 Change the audience to state legislators, add mitigating historical perspectives, and even a strong message can pass review, at least if it is
not narrowly sectarian.1 56 A mild Christian message directed to the public
for a short period at Christmas may pass constitutional scrutiny,1 57 while a
15 8
stronger message with government more clearly behind it might not.
The following discussion seeks to demonstrate that the opinions can be
understood as attempts to demarcate the permissible level of religious expression by government. The point is not that the cases yield consistent
15 9
answers, but that the answers given are all directed at this question.
(i) Prayer
The Court's most recent Establishment Clause decision was also its latest attempt to set limits on religious expression by government. In Lee v.
Weisman," the Court invalidated the practice in Providence, Rhode Island, of including invocation and benediction prayers in public middle and
high school graduation ceremonies. The Court found:
These dominant facts mark and control the confines of our decision:
State officials direct the performance of a formal religious exercise at
promotional and graduation ceremonies for secondary schools.
Even for those students who object to the religious exercise, their
attendance and participation in the state-sponsored religious activity

154. E.g., County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he 'history
and ubiquity' of a practice is relevant... because it provides part of the context in which a
reasonable observer evaluates whether a challenged governmental practice conveys a message of
endorsement of religion."); Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2679-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (placing emphasis on
historical perspective).
155. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2649; Stone, 449 U.S. at 39.
156. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 783.
157. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668.
158. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573.
159. See id, at 629 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("To be sure, the endorsement test depends on
a sensitivity to the unique circumstances and context of a particular challenged practice and, like
any test that is sensitive to context, it may not always yields results with unanimous agreement at
the margins.").

160. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
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are in fair and real sense obligatory, though the school district does
not require attendance as a condition for receipt of the diploma. 6 '
Government decided that the religious exercise would occur; chose the
religious participant; directed and controlled the content of the prayer; and
created "subtle coercive pressures" to participate or appear to participate. 162 In short, government support for a clear religious message directed
to a captive audience which included school children transgressed the Constitution's minimum guarantee: "Government may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way
which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.' "163
In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter placed emphagis on the same
factors. In his view, the essence of the issue was where this activity fell on
the spectrum of religious speech by government:
[The government argues] that graduation prayers are no different
from presidential religious proclamations and similar official "acknowledgments" of religion in public life. But religious invocations
in Thanksgiving Day addresses and the like, rarely noticed, ignored
without effort, conveyed over an impersonal medium, and directed
at no one in particular, inhabit a pallid zone worlds apart from official prayers delivered to a captive audience of public school students
and their families. 64
The other post-Lemon case to involve government-sponsored, public
prayer was Marsh v. Chambers.165 The Nebraska Legislature opened each
session with a prayer offered by its chaplain. The chaplain earned $319.75
each month that the legislature was in session. Although chosen biennially,
the same Presbyterian minister had served for eighteen years.' 66 The Court
found this practice consistent with the Constitution.
Notably, the Court focused on the four usually decisive factors. The
Court examined the potency of the religious message, the extent to which
government is perceived to stand behind it, and the audience to whom it
was directed, and the historical context-a factor of decisive importance in
this case.167 The Court stated:

161. Id. at 2655.
162. Id. at 2656.
163. Id. at 2655 (citation omitted); see also id. at 2664 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (Prayer is
impermissible because government may not endorse or promote religion, or engage in religious
practice.).
164. Id. at 2678 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
165. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
166. Id. at 784-85.
167. This is notable because Marsh was the first post-Lemon case not to inquire into purpose,
effect, and entanglement, and because Marsh predated Justice O'Connor's endorsement approach.
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From colonial times through the founding of the Republic and ever
since, the practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with the principles of disestablishment and religious freedom.
It can hardly be thought that in the same week Members of the First
Congress voted to appoint and to pay a chaplain for each House and
also voted to approve the draft of the First Amendment for submission to the states, they intended the Establishment Clause of the
Amendment to forbid what they had just declared acceptable.1 6 8
This historical perspective was the context in which Nebraska's practice
must be evaluated:
[T]he delegates [to the constitutional convention] did not consider
opening prayers as a proselytizing activity or as symbolically placing
the government's "official seal of approval on one religious view."
.... Rather, the Founding Fathers looked at invocations as "conduct whose effect harmonized with the tenets of some or all religions.".... Here, the individual claiming injury by the practice is
an adult, presumably not readily susceptible to "religious
indoctrination."16 9
Moreover, "there [wa]s no indication that the prayer opportunity ha[d]
been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other,
faith or belief." 1 0 Rather the prayers were nonsectarian, although in the
Judeo-Christian tradition, "with 'elements of the American civil

religion.' "171
(ii) Seasonal display of religious symbols
The two cases reviewing public, seasonal displays containing religious
symbols illustrate increased concentration on the message sent by the display and government's role in sending it. The first case, Lynch v. Donnelly,1 72 evaluated a city-sponsored Christmas scene:
Each year... the city of Pawtucket, R.I., erects a Christmas display
as part of its observance of the Christmas holiday season. The display is situated in a park owned by a nonprofit organization and is
located in the heart of the shopping district. . . .The Pawtucket
display comprises many of the figures and decorations traditionally
associated with Christmas, including, among other things, a Santa
168. Id. at 786, 790.
169. IMLat 792 (citations omitted).
170. Id. at 794-95.
171. Id. at 793 n.14. In dissent, Justice Brennan focused on the same factors. Id. at 798
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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Clause house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, candy-striped poles, a
Christmas tree, carolers, cutout figures representing such characters
as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of colored
lights, a large banner that reads "SEASONS GREETINGS," and [a
city-owned] creche....
The majority concluded that to include the creche in the display did not
have the effect of advancing religion prohibited by the second prong of
Lemon. The Court surveyed the cases and found that greater benefits have
been tolerated.'

74

Concurring, Justice O'Connor first articulated her now well-known endorsement approach. Introduced as a refinement of Lemon, the inquiry is
whether government's actual purpose was to endorse religion or, regardless
of purpose, whether that is the effect of the activity. 175 This approach turns
on the message communicated:
Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members
of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite
message. 176
What is crucial is that a government practice not have the effect of
communicating a message
of government endorsement or disap77

proval of religion. 1

Focusing on the entire display, not just the creche, Justice O'Connor
17
concluded that the city's purpose was to celebrate a public holiday. 1
Moreover, the display, as a whole and in its seasonal context, could not be
"understood to endorse the religious content of the holiday."' 179 Rather,

173. Id. at 671.
174. Id. at 681-83. The basis of this comparison is difficult to discern. See William Van
Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v.
Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 783.
175. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
176. Id. at 688.
177. Id. at 692.
178. Id. at 691. (O'Connor, J., concurring). The majority opinion also focused on the entire
display. To "[f]ocus exclusively on the religious component of any activity would inevitably lead
to its invalidation. . . ." Id. at 680. In contrast, the dissent focused on inclusion of the creche.
"'The primary effect' of including a nativity scene in the city's display is, as the District Court
found, to place the government's imprimatur of approval on the particular religious beliefs exemplified by the creche." Id. at 701 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
179. Id. at 692. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) It is the context, in Justice O'Connor's view, that
explains why museum display of religious art fails to send a message that government endorses
religion. Id. at 692. Context explains other cases:
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government simply celebrated a common holiday, which has strong secular
components, with traditional holiday symbols.18
By the time the Court decided the next holiday-display case five years
later, the entire Court focused sharply on the message sent by the activity
under review. Under consideration in County ofAllegheny 81 were two displays. One was a creche constructed on the main staircase of the Allegheny
County Courthouse; the other included a menorah outside the city-county
building. The Court described the creche display in these terms:
The county courthouse is . . . [the] seat of government ....

The

"main," "most beautiful," and "most public" part of the courthouse
is its Grand Staircase....
Since 1981, the county has permitted the Holy Name Society, a
Roman Catholic group, to display a creche in the county courthouse
during the Christmas holiday season....
The creche in the county courthouse, like other creches, is a visual representation of the scene in the manger in Bethlehem shortly
after the birth of Jesus, as described in the Gospels of Luke and
Matthew. The creche includes figures of the infant Jesus, Mary, Joseph, farm animals, shepherds and wise men, all placed in or before
a wooden representation of a manger, which has at its crest an angel
bearing a banner that proclaims "Gloria in Excelsis Deo!"
During the 1986-87 holiday season, the creche was on display on
the Grand Staircase from November 26 to January 9.... It had a
wooden fence on three sides and bore a plaque stating: "This Dis-

[Government] "acknowledgments" of religion [such] as.. . declaration of Thanksgiving as
a public holiday, printing of "In God We Trust" on coins, and opening court sessions with
"God save the United States and this honorable court". . . serve, in the only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is
worthy of appreciation in society. For that reason, and because of their history and ubiquity, those practices are not understood as conveying government approval of particular
religious beliefs.
Id. at 692; (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); see also County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 n.46 (plurality
opinion of Blackmun, J.).
180. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693. (O'Connor, J., concurring). The four justices in dissent also
focused on "whether Pawtucket [ran] afoul of the Establishment Clause by endorsing religion
through its display of the creche." Id. at 697-98 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). They concluded
that:
Pawtucket's inclusion of a life-sized display depicting the biblical description of the birth of
Christ as part of its annual Christmas celebration is unconstitutional. Nothing in the history of such practices or the setting in which the city's creche is presented obscures or
diminishes the plain fact that Pawtucket's action amounts to an impermissible governmental endorsement of a particular faith.
Id at 695 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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play Donated by the Holy Name Society." Sometime during the
week of December 2, the county placed red and white poinsettia
plants around the fence.... The county also placed a small evergreen tree, decorated with a red bow, behind each of the two
endposts of the fence.... These trees stood alongside the manger
backdrop and were slightly shorter than it was. The angel thus was
at the apex of the creche display. Altogether, the [display] occupied
a substantial amount of space on the Grand Staircase. No figures of
Santa Claus or other decorations appeared on the Grand
82
Staircase. 1
The City-County Building is separate and a block removed from the
County Courthouse and, as the name implies, is jointly owned by the
city of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County ....
For a number of years, the city has had a large Christmas tree
under the middle arch outside the [arched and columned] Grant
Street entrance. Following this practice, city employees on November 17, 1986, erected a 45-foot tree under the middle arch and decorated it with lights and ornaments ....
A few days later, the city
placed at the foot of the tree a sign bearing the mayor's name and
entitled "Salute to Liberty." Beneath the title, the sign stated:
"During this holiday season, the city of Pittsburgh salutes liberty.
Let these festive lights remind us that we are the keepers of the flame
of liberty and our legacy of freedom." At least since 1982, the city
has expanded its Grant Street holiday display to include a symbolic
representation of Chanukah .... 183
On December 22 of the 1986 holiday season, the city placed at
the Grant Street entrance ... an 18-foot Chanukah menorah ... .
Justice Blackmun, with Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and
185
O'Connor, concluded that the creche conveyed an objectionable message.
In this setting, the "county sen[t] an unmistakable message that it supports
and promotes the Christian praise to God that is the creche's religious
message."' 186 Unlike the display in Lynch, the creche here sent an unambiguous Christian message:

182. Id. at 579-81 (footnotes and citations omitted).
183. Id. at 581-82.

184. Id. at 587 (footnotes and citations omitted).
185. The majority agreed that "[w]hether the key word is 'endorsement,' 'favoritism,' or 'promotion,' the essential principle remains the same. The Establishment Clause, at the very least,

prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief.
Id at
593-94.
186. Id. at 600. (Kennedy, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., White & Scalia, fi., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, the majority opinion on this point tracked the
elements outlined in this section:
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Lynch teaches that government may celebrate Christmas in some
manner and form, but not in a way that endorses Christian doctrine.
Here, Allegheny County has transgressed this line. It has chosen to
celebrate Christmas in a way that has the effect of endorsing a pamessage: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus
tently Christian
18 7
Christ.

The four Justices in dissent on this issue, Justices Kennedy, White,
Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, would require a stronger message
before finding a constitutional violation. Mere endorsement of a sectarian
message should not be enough. Rather:
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise;
and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact
"establishes a state religion or religious faith, or tends to do so." ...
These two principles, while distinct, are not unrelated, for it would
be difficult indeed to establish a religion without some measure of
more or less subtle coercion, be it in the form of taxation to supply
the substantial benefits that would sustain a state-established faith,
exhortation to redirect compulsion to observance, or governmental
18 8
ligiosity that amounts in fact to proselytizing.

There is no doubt, of course, that the creche itself is capable of communicating a religious
Under the Court's holding in Lynch, the effect of a creche display turns on its
message....
setting....[T]he creche sits on the Grand Staircase, the "main" and "most beautiful part"
of the building that is the seat of county government .... No viewer could reasonably
think that it occupies this location without the support and approval of the government.
Thus, by permitting the "display of the creche in this particular physical setting," ... the
county sends an unmistakable message that it supports and promotes the Christian praise
to God that is the creche's religious message.
Id. at 598-600 (footnote omitted and citations omitted).
187. Id. at 601; see also id. at 626 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (The display endorsed Christianity and conveyed a message that Christians were "favored members of the political community"
concurring in part and dissenting in
and nonChristians were outsiders.); id at 652 (Stevens, J.,
part) ("Application of a strong presumption against the public use of religious symbols... will
prohibit a display only when its message, evaluated in the context in which it is presented, is
nonsecular.") (footnote omitted).
188. Id at 659-60 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
The majority concluded that his approach simply lowered the threshold:
Indeed, perhaps the only real distinction between Justice Kennedy's "proselytization" test
and the Court's "endorsement" inquiry is a burden of "unmistakable" clarity that Justice
Kennedy apparently would require of government favoritism for specific sects in order to
hold the favoritism in violation of the Establishment Clause.... The question whether a
particular practice "would place the government's weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize for a particular religion.., is much the same as whether the practice demonstrates
the government's support, promotion, or "endorsement" of the particular creed of a partic-
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This approach also embraces a focus on the message. Indeed, Justice
Kennedy later noted the importance of the same four factors which typically receive emphasis: the potency of the religious message; the extent to
which government can be seen to stand behind it; the audience to whom it
is directed; and the existence of mitigating factors, such as historical perspective. The Court stated that:
[C]oercion need not be a direct tax in aid of religion or a test oath.
Symbolic recognition or accommodation of religious faith may violate the Clause in an extreme case. I doubt not, for example, that
the Clause forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of a large
Latin cross on the roof of city hall. This is ... because such an
obtrusive year-round religious display would place the government's
weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion.' 9
In [any case, when] determining whether there exists an establishment, or a tendency toward one, we refer to the other types of
church-state contacts that have existed unchallenged throughout our
history, or that have been found permissible in our case law.190
A different majority concluded that the display outside the city-county
building sent an acceptable message. Not unsurprisingly, the four Justices
who concluded that the creche display was constitutional also approved the
They were joined by Justices Blackmun and
city-county display.'
different reasons, found no unconstitutional
somewhat
for
O'Connor who,
message. Justice Blackmun concluded that:
The relevant question for Establishment Clause purposes is whether
the combined display of the tree, the sign, and the menorah has the
effect of endorsing both Christian and Jewish faiths, or rather simply
recognizes that both Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same
winter-holiday season, which has attained a secular status in our society. Of the two interpretations of this particular display, the latter
192
seems fair more plausible ....
In Justice O'Connor's view, however:
ular sect--except to the extent that it requires an "obvious" allegiance between the government and the sect.
Id. at 608 (footnote and citations omitted).
189. Id. at 661 (footnote and citations omitted).
190. Id. at 662 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
191. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192. Id. at 616 (plurality opinion of Blackmun, J.). Justice Blackmun also found it:
"[D]istinctively implausible to view the combined display ... as endorsing Jewish faith
alone.... When a city [with a small Jewish population] like Pittsburgh places a symbol of
Chanukah next to a symbol of Christmas, the result may be a simultaneous endorsement of
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[T]he relevant question for Establishment Clause purposes is
whether the city of Pittsburgh's display of the menorah, the religious
symbol of a religious holiday, next to a Christmas tree and a sign
saluting liberty sends a message of government endorsement of Judaism or whether it sends
a message of pluralism and freedom to
1 93
choose one's own beliefs.
By accompanying its display of a Christmas tree-a secular symbol of the Christmas holiday season-with a salute to liberty, and by
adding a religious symbol from a Jewish holiday also celebrated at
roughly the same time of the year, I conclude that the city did not
endorse Judaism or religion in general, but rather conveyed a
message of pluralism and freedom of belief during the holiday

season. 194
(iii) Religious doctrine in schools
In Stone v. Graham,195 the Court, per curiam, struck down a Kentucky
statute that required that a copy of the Ten Commandments be posted on
the wall of each public classroom.1 96 The Court found that the statute
lacked a secular purpose and thus fell under the first prong of the Lemon
test. 197 The factors that negate the existence of a secular purpose are the
same issues at the heart of other cases to limit religious speech by government: the strength of the religious message, the audience to whom it is
directed, the extent that it has government backing, and any mitigating effects of context. The Court in Stone stated that:
The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the
Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact. The Commandments do not confine themselves to arguably secular matters, such as
honoring one's parents, killing or murder, adultery, stealing, false
witness, and covetousness. See Exodus 20: 12-17; Deuteronomy 5:
16-21. Rather, the first part of the Commandments concerns the
religious duties of believers: worshipping the Lord God alone, avoidChristianity and Judaism... [but it] cannot reasonably be understood as an endorsement
of Jewish-yet not Christian-belief."
Idr at 616 n.64.
193. Id. at 634.
194. Id. at 635. In dissent, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens "thought that the answer
as to the first display supplied the answer to the second." Id. at 637 (Brennan, Marshall, &
Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
196. d at 39-40.
197. Id. at 41-43.
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ing idolatry, not using the Lord's name in vain, and observing the
Sabbath Day ....
This is not a case in which the Ten Commandments are integrated into the school curriculum, where the Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics,
comparative religion, or the like.... Posting of religious texts on the
wall serves no such educational function. If the posted copies of the
Ten Commandments are to have any effect at all, it will be to induce
the school children to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and
obey, the Commandments....
It does not matter that the posted copies of the Ten Commandments are financed by voluntary private contributions, for the mere
posting of the copies under the auspices of the legislature provides
the "official support of the State Government.. .
4. Endorsement and equality compared
There are three important differences between the equality and the endorsement inquiries. First, departure from the principles of equality have
been justified as necessary to protect Free Exercise values. Government
could overcome the presumption against religious classifications in order to
take some action designed to allow religion to operate more or less unhindered. By contrast, when government endorses a religious message, no
barriers to religious practice are removed. One cannot fairly characterize as
a barrier a policy not to grant favored access to government prestige, any
more than it is useful to say that establishment of an official religion
removes the burden of lawful religious competition. 9 9 Simply put, the
cases which countenance a religious classification involve attempts to reconcile religious exercise with burdensome interests at work in the world. The
endorsement cases present no such conflict.2 °°
198. Id. at 41-42 (footnote and citation omitted).
199. As Justice O'Connor has said, the task is to:
[S]eparate those benefits to religion that constitutionally accommodate the free exercise of
religion from those that provide unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious organizations.... [I]n order to perceive the government action as a permissible accommodation of
religion, there must in fact be an identifiable burden on the exercise of religion that can be
said to be lifted by the government action.
Amos, 483 U.S. at 348 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). See also County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 613 n.59 ("Prohibiting the display of a creche at this location, it bears repeating, does no impose a burden on the practice of Christianity (except to the extent some Christian
sect seeks to be an officially approved religion), and therefore permitting the display is not an
"accommodation" of religion in the conventional sense.").
200. "The display of a creche in a courthouse does not remove any burden on the free exercise of Christianity. Christians remain free to display creches in their homes and churches."
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601 n.51.
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Second, principles of equality are clumsy tools with which to evaluate
religious speech. For example, when government seeks to facilitate exercise
by removing a regulatory or private barrier, it imposes a norm designed to
serve that end. That norm seeks to distinguish exempt from non-exempt
activity and employs a classification crafted to encompass the religious activity. Accordingly, constitutional doctrine tailored to separate permissible
classifications from impermissible ones, like equal protection principles, are
well suited to this task. By contrast, constitutional models designed to assess the validity of regulatory classifications are ill suited for use in the endorsement context. When government participates in religious expression,
regulatory classifications are simply not at issue. Rather, in the endorsement cases any objectionable inequality stems from a forbidden message. If
there is no message of sectarian preference, there is no sectarian preference.
If no objectionable message is endorsed, there is no constitutional difficulty.
Any benefits and burdens caused by government participation in religious
expression flow from identification with the message. Therefore, the constitutional restraints properly focus on the message sent by the government's
action.
Third, and conversely, when religious classifications are at issue, the endorsement inquiry adds nothing to the equality inquiry; rather, endorsement is merely parasitic. In the equality cases, an illicit classification
delivered an objectionable message of favoritism. If a message of sectarian
preference was present it was because government employed an unjustified
or ill-crafted sectarian classification. The classification was thus at the root
of the constitutional difficulty and therefore was the appropriate focus of
the constitutional inquiry.
5. Endorsement and subsidy compared
At its core, the prohibition against endorsement is a limit on government speech, while the prohibition against undue subsidy is a limit on government donations. The essence of endorsement is that government lent its
voice to a religious message, or has given a special place to a particular
religious message, such as providing preferred access to an audience. In a
phrase, endorsement speaks to the status given a religious message. The
expenditure of government funds is an incidental matter.
In contrast, the subsidy cases are concerned with distribution of (other)
government resources. The constitutional injury stems from support for the
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religious business of religious organizations. The expenditure of government funds is at the center of the controversy."'
D. When Government Acts as Referee: RestrainingPrinciplesof Church
Autonomy
The First Amendment forbids government review of certain church decisions: Government must accept church answers on various questions as
final. Religious organizations retain sovereign authority over particular
matters and, therefore, some substantive issues are placed outside government control. This constitutional prohibition has given rise to principles of
church autonomy 20 2 that have manifested themselves in two contexts. With
regard to the exercise of judicial power, the Constitution renders certain
questions nonjusticiable. With regard to executive power, these cases suggest limits on the government's ability to enforce regulatory requirements.
Religious organizations are given certain independence to operate their dayto-day affairs, at least in regard to religious matters.2" 3
The discussion that follows is organized, not by doctrine, but by the
nature of the case. The first group concerns the role of civil courts in
resolving intrachurch disputes. In this context, the Court has forbidden
judicial resolution of theological and other important internal church matters. Definition of which decisions are church reserved for the Church
emerges as a dominant theme in these cases. In the second line of cases, the
Court has ruled that restrictions designed to avoid an unconstitutional subsidy to parochial schools can unconstitutionally entangle government in
201. For a discussion of cases that explore this intersection, see infra notes 258-82 and accompanying text.
202. I can think of no better way to describe the idea that the Establishment Clause places

certain substantive issues outside the reach of the government. However, the discussion in this
section focuses on the competence of government to undertake a task, not on the idea that a

church has a "right" of sovereign authority. The Church has autonomy and sovereignty by default.
Commentators are split over whether the Establishment Clause protects church autonomy.
See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1373, 1378-88 (1981) (arguing against Establishment Clause protection because "government support for religion is an element of every establishment clause claim"); William P. Marshall &
Douglas C. Blomgren, Regulating Religious Organizations Under the Establishment Clause, 47
OHIO ST. L.J. 293 (1986) (The Establishment Clause offers no protection.); Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Government Interference with Religious Organizations,41 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 347 (1984) (arguing that the Establishment Clause ought to shield religious organizations from regulation and ought to preclude judicial resolution of intra-church disputes).
203. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976) (The constitutional prohibitions serve to prevent government from "entangle[ment] in essentially religious
controversies."); id. at 718 (The process of "detailed review" of church decisions offends the

constitution.).
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church affairs. Again, the cases suggest that a law might ask questions reserved for churches alone. In addition, the focus in these cases is often on
the oversight required by valid regulation. Therefore, a church's sphere of
operational independence is also at issue. The intrachurch disputes are

presented first because the cases which evaluate regulatory oversight can be
better understood once the notion of nonjusticiable religious issues is
established.
A third section discusses the cases that have arisen outside these two
contexts. Although no government action has been invalidated, the Court
has suggested that the principles of autonomy might find application in sufficiently analogous circumstances.
At one level, it is perhaps easiest to see the essentially separable character of the constitutional restraints imposed in these cases. In none of these
cases does government employ a religious classification to impose a burden
or distribute a benefit. 2" Indeed, the constitutional violations turn in no
way on a benefit-financial or otherwise-to the group awarded the constitutional shield; thus, the restrictions on subsidies are inapplicable. And in
none of the cases is a government sponsored religious message anything but
a derivative matter.
At another level, though, the principles at work here may have the
broadest potential application, despite the narrow context to which they are
presently confined. In each case to find a constitutional violation, one way
to view the Court's ruling is that the Court decided that some question was
too religious for government to answer. Yet the application of any legal
standard-including constitutional standards-can turn on a religious
question. For example, the principles of equality are triggered by a religious
classification; the endorsement inquiry asks whether government has sent a
message that religion or a religious belief is favored or preferred; the subsidy
cases limit government support for specifically religious activity; different
subsidy rules apply if a pervasively sectarian religious organization is the
recipient.20 5 At some point, the constitution may disable government from
resolving these issues, too.

204. Except, that is, classifications designed to avoid an Establishment Clause problem. E.g.,
Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, supra notes 121-24; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, supra notes 113-16. See also infra part II.D.[2]. Such classifications, naturally, are backed by
a sufficient justification. The question ought to remain, however, whether they were closely tailored just to avoid providing an undue subsidy.
205. See, eg., Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in ConstitutionalLaw, 72 CAL. L.

REV. 753 (1984); Philip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in FirstAmendment Religion Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REV. 817, 831-39 (1984).
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Notably, to the extent that they shield religious groups from government-imposed burdens, the principles developed in these cases parallel protections afforded under the Free Exercise Clause. Indeed, in several cases,
the Court rested its decision broadly on "the First Amendment," and not
narrowly on the Establishment Clause.2 °6 The reason is straightforward:
"[For] government [to] declare which party is correct in matters of religion,
... would violate the principles of both religion clauses. A judicial declaration of such matters would simultaneously establish one religious view as
correct for the organization while inhibiting the free exercise of the oppos' 20 7
ing belief."
Historically, the Free Exercise Clause has served to invalidate substantial burdens on both religious beliefs and practices. However, the Court's
latest Free Exercise case, Departmentof Human Resources v. Smith, 20 8 significantly constricted the concept of unconstitutional burden. 209 After
Smith, the only laws necessarily barred by the Free Exercise Clause are
those which regulate "religious beliefs as such" or which seek "to ban [religiously motivated] acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for
religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display."' 2 10 Smith may therefore call the cases in this group into question, to
the extent that they rest on the conclusion that government impermissibly
burdened the autonomy of religious organizations. 21 I As a consequence,
2 12
any other grounds on which these decisions rest become important.
206. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490,
501-04 (1979); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 712.
207. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.12, at 1242
(4th ed. 1991). See generally Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church
Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1291 (1980)
(Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses combine to require deference to church decisions.).
208. 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (Burdens on religiously motivated acts or abstentions that
result from the incidental effects of an otherwise valid, generally applicable criminal law do not
transgress the Free Exercise Clause.).
209. As the dissent in Smith observed:
This Court over the years painstakingly has developed a consistent and exacting standard to test the constitutionality of a state statute that burdens the free exercise of religion.
Such a statute may stand only if the law in general, and the State's refusal to allow a
religious exemption in particular, are justified by a compelling interest that cannot be
served by less restrictive means.
Id. at 907-09 and n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supra note 18.
210. Smith at 877.
211. However, the Smith majority stated that government may not "lend its power to one or
the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma." Id. (citation omitted); see infra
notes 226-30 and accompanying text. Whether this means a controversy purely over religious
dogma is uncertain.
212. It is my view that the constraints in this area should be more firmly grounded in an idea
that government is simply incompetent to answer certain questions. Much of the commentary in
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1. Intrachurch disputes
There is little difficulty with the conclusion that Presbyterians and
Lutherans cannot ask a judicial officer which faith best knows God.2 1 3 Indeed, for civil courts to answer questions of religious doctrine simply to
resolve a doctrinal dispute between two warring religious factions would be
a blatant step toward establishment. Although the Court has not confronted a case that was simply a dispute over religious doctrine, religious
questions have arisen in litigation over matters within the realm of legitimate government concern, such as the ownership of property. The Court
has explained the central constitutional prohibition in these terms:
In language having "a clear constitutional ring," [the Court]
reasoned:
"The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of
no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the
decision of controverted questions of faith within the association,
and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members,
congregations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All who united themselves to such a body do so with an
implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit it. But
it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of
such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions
could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of
the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish
tribunals for the decisions of questions arising among themselves,
that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical
cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for."2 14
In addition, these cases also suggest that the Establishment Clause renders certain issues nonjusticiable. In the Court's words, "it is the essence of
religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are to be acthis area has focused on the extent to which a free exercise principle of church autonomy is
necessary to protect the religious liberty of church members. See, e.g., Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord:. CriticalEvaluation of Discriminationby Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514 (1979); Laycock, supra note 202 (arguing in favor of such a
principle); Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REv. 391 (1987) (arguing against constitutionally protected
church autonomy).
213. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871). There is no difference between
a statute that enforces one view of religious doctrine and a judicial ruling that has a similar effect.
214. Serbian E. OrthodoxDiocese, 426 U.S. at 710-11 (emphasis omitted). Watson was a preErie case decided under common-law principles.
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cepted as matters of faith whether or not rational or measurable by objective criteria. . . . [Legal standards] are therefore hardly relevant to such
matters of ecclesiastical cognizance." 2 15 Moreover, an ecclesiastical tribunal is the more competent, forum entitled to deference.2 16
For all of these reasons, church authority over various matters is quite
broad. The following two post-Lemon cases illustrate this point. In Jones
v. Wolf,217 a majority of the members of the Vineville Presbyterian Church
voted to split from the Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS)
and affiliate instead with the Presbyterian Church in America (PCA).2 13
The only litigated issue was which faction owned the local church assets.
The split occurred in 1973, sixty-nine years after the local church's organization and affiliation with PCUS. After investigation, PCUS, which employed hierarchical, as opposed to congregational, governance, ruled that
the minority faction loyal to PCUS was the true Vineville Presbyterian
Church and, therefore, entitled to the church property. 21 9 At issue, in a
sense, was whether the church property was held in trust for PCUS.
On one level, the court found the black-letter law clear. Civil courts
cannot resolve church property disputes in a way which decides underlying
questions of religious doctrine or practice. 220 Rather, a civil court must
defer to the resolution of religious questions by religious bodies. 221 How215. Id. at 714-15. Compare this reasoning to the political question doctrine:
In Baker v. Carr, ... we noted that political questions are not justiciable primarily because
of the separation of powers within the Federal Government. After reviewing our decisions
in this area, we concluded that on the surface of any case hold to involve a political question was at least one of the following formulations:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to
a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various department on one question.
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-19 (1969) (citations omitted). As a matter of language,
at least, the parallels to the first three Baker v. Carr formulations are strong. The First Amendment is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" of religious issues to another decision-maker; there are no judicial standards; and an initial nonjudicial policy determination may be
unavoidable.
216. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 686 n.8.
217. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
218. Id. at 598. One hundred sixty-four members voted for the split, and 94 voted against the
split.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 604.
221. Id.
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ever, so long as government does not immerse itself in questions of religious
doctrine, it can provide presumptive legal rules.2 22
The Court concluded that the "trust" issue did not necessarily implicate
religious questions. Thus, the Constitution did not require Georgia to defer
to the PCUS decision. The Georgia court could decide the dispute by reference to "neutral principles of law" in a manner which avoided impermissible resolution of an underlying question of religious doctrine.2 23 The court
could interpret the language of the deeds, which vested title in the local
church. Next, it could examine state statutes on implied trusts and ownership of church property. Likewise, it could look to the corporate charter of
the church, or in the constitution of the general church, to see if either
indicated a trust in favor of the general church.22 4 However, if the interpretation of the instruments of ownership or the church's governing documents turned on a religious issue, the court must defer to the church's
decision on the religious question.225
The other post-Lemon case to consider judicial resolution of a church
dispute, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,2 2 6 centered on
control of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and
Canada. The mother church defrocked and removed Bishop Dionisisje as
bishop of the diocese, installed Bishop Firmilian as administrator of the
diocese in his place, and reorganized the diocese into three parts. Bishop
Dionisisje sued in Illinois state court to invalidate his removal and defrockment and the reorganization of the diocese, and sought to enjoin the mother
church from interfering with assets controlled by the diocese.22 7 The Illinois Supreme Court settled two key issues. First, it held that his removal
and defrockment should be set aside as arbitrary and inconsistent with the
mother church's constitution and penal code.2 28 Second, it held that the
reorganization was invalid because the mother church needed the approval
222. "Mhe First Amendment [does not] require[ ] the States to adopt a rule of compulsory
deference to religious authority in resolving church property disputes, even where no issue of
doctrinal controversy is involved." Id at 605. After all, a state has an "obvious and legitimate
interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where ownership of church property can be determined conclusively." Id. at 602 (citing Presbyterian
Church v. Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445 (1969)).
223. Id. at 600.
224. Jones, 443 U.S. at 601-03.
225. Id. at 604. A conclusion that the local church owned the property left open the question
of who spoke for the local church. That question could be resolved in a like manner: by reference
to local law and secular portions of church documents. Id.
226. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
227. Id. at 697-708.
228. Id. at 708.
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of the diocese.2 2 9 In short, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the
mother church acted inconsistently with its own norms.
The Supreme Court struck down the Illinois court's action on both issues. On the first issue, the Supreme Court held that review of the mother
church's decision to remove and defrock Bishop Dionisisje, even under an
arbitrariness standard, was foreclosed. Matters of church discipline, like
matters of church theology, are outside the scope of judicial review:
[W]here resolution of [such] disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the First
and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a
church hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as binding on them, in their application to the religious issues of doctrine or
polity [or administration] before them.2 3 °
Indeed, a court cannot even decide where the focus of decision-making authority lies:
[C]ivil courts do not inquire whether the relevant [hierarchical]
church governing body has power under religious law [to decide the
case at hand] ....
Such a determination ...frequently necessitates the interpretation of ambiguous religious law and usage. To permit civil courts to
probe deeply enough into the allocation of power within a [hierarchical] church so as to decide.., religious law [governing church
polity] . ..would violate the First Amendment in much the same
23 1
manner as civil determination of religious doctrine.i
On the other issue, whether the mother church had the authority to
reorganize the diocese, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the reorganization was "in clear and palpable excess of [the mother church's] own jurisdiction. ' 232 In reversing this decision, the Supreme Court stated that:

229. Id.
230. Id. at 709.
231. Id. at 708-09 (citations omitted). Despite this broad language, the Court left open the

possibility of some review:
[W]hether or not there is room for "marginal civil court review" under the narrow rubrics
of "fraud" or "collusion" when church tribunals act in bad faith for secular purposes, no
"arbitrariness" exception-in the sense of an inquiry whether the decisions of the highest
ecclesiastical tribunal of a hierarchial church complied with the church laws and regulations-is consistent with the constitutional mandate that civil courts are bound to accept
the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchial polity on
matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.
Id. at 713 (footnote omitted).
232. Id. at 724.

1992] MODERN CONSTRAINTS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE 953

[The Illinois Supreme Court] premised [its decision] on its view that
the early history of the Diocese "manifested a clear intention to retain independence and autonomy in its administrative affairs while
at the same time becoming ecclesiastically and judicially an organic
part of the Serbian Orthodox Church," and its interpretation of the
constitution of the American-Canadian Diocese as confirming this
intention. It also interpreted the constitution of the [Mother
Church], which was adopted after the Diocesan constitution, in a
manner consistent with this conclusion....
[In so doing,] the Supreme Court of Illinois substituted its interpretation of the Diocesan and Mother Church constitutions for that

of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals in which church law vests authority to make that interpretation.2 33

This a court may not do. Issues of church governance, like theological
and disciplinary issues, are outside the purview of judicial power.23 4 The
Illinois Supreme Court violated the Constitution when it contravened the
235
mother church's decision as to the scope of its governing authority.
233. Id (citation to lower court opinion omitted).
234. "[R]eligious freedom encompasses the 'power of religious bodies to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and
doctrine."' Id at 721-22 (citation omitted).
235. Again, the Court recognized the validity of inquiry into some threshold matters, like
whether the diocese consented to the mother church's control, although judicial inquiry even on
that issue is circumscribed. For to delve too deeply:
[I]nto the various church constitutional provisions relevant to this [inquiry] ... would
repeat the error of the Illinois Supreme Court. It suffices to note that the reorganization of
the Diocese involves a matter of internal church government, an issue at the core of ecclesiastical affairs; Arts. 57 and 64 of the Mother Church constitution commit such questions
of church polity to the final province of [its] Holy Assembly.
Idk at 721.
The subordination of the Diocese to the Mother Church in such matters, which are not
only "administrative" but also "hierarchial," was provided, and the power of the Holy
Assembly to reorganize the Diocese is expressed in the Mother Church constitution. Contrary to the interpretation of the Illinois court, the church judicatories interpreted the provisions of the Diocesan constitution not to interdict or govern this action, but only to relate
to the day-to-day administration of Diocesan property. The constitutional provisions of
the American-Canadian Diocese were not so express that the civil courts could enforce
them without engaging in a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church
polity.
Id. at 721-23 (footnotes omitted). In the course of this passage, the Court cited various provisions
of the governance documents in three footnotes. Id at nn.12-14.
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Regulatory burdens

Each case finding regulatory oversight unconstitutional involved a program that provided aid to parochial elementary and secondary schools. In
each case, regulatory oversight:
(a) Involved resolution of religious questions and
236
(b) Was substantial and ongoing.
These limiting features are crucial. Unconstitutional entanglement has
meant oversight over religious issues. Parochial schools are pervasively sectarian religious organizations in which the secular and religious cannot be
separated. Hence, oversight would mean that government repeatedly
would be required to settle religious disputes over which it has no competence. Consequently, subsidies to pervasively sectarian religious organizations are therefore unavoidable. 237 As such, they may not necessarily be
fairly attributable to a government decision to subsidize religious activity.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,231 for instance, the Court invalidated the Rhode
Island Salary Supplement Act, which authorized salary supplements to
teachers of secular subjects in sectarian elementary schools. 2 39 To avoid the
unconstitutional effect of subsidizing teachers who inculcate religion, the
statute required that recipients teach only courses offered in public schools
with texts and materials used public schools, and that they refrain from
"teaching any course in religion."'24 Notwithstanding these restrictions,
the court found that:
[Clomprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance
will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are
obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise respected .... These
prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church.
There is another area of entanglement in the Rhode Island program that gives concern. The statute excludes teachers employed by
nonpublic schools whose average per-pupil expenditures on secular
236. If one views the problem as government competence to answer religious questions the
issues in these cases become more sensible. Government is incompetent to answer religious questions; therefore, its executive branch may not undertake extensive oversight of definitionally religious issues.
237. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text. See also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. at
649 (Brennan, J.,dissenting) ("to implement the required monitoring, we would have to kill the
patient to cure what ailed him").
238. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
239. Id. at 609. The supplement could be in an amount up to 15% of the teacher's salary, but
only to the level earned by public school teaches. Various restrictions applied; to be eligible, the
teacher's school had to spend less per pupil than the state average in public schools. Id. at 609-10.
240. Id. at 619.
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education equal or exceed the comparable figures for public schools.
In the event that the total expenditures of an otherwise eligible
school exceed this norm, the program requires the government to
examine the school's records in order to determine how much of the
total expenditures is attributable to secular education and how much
to religious activity. This kind of state inspection and evaluation of
the religious content of a religious organization is fraught with the
sort of entanglement that the Constitution forbids. It is a relationship pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction of
church schools and hence of churches. 24 1
More recently, in Aguilar v. Felton,2 42 the Court invalidated a program
to deliver remedial education to educationally deprived children. Under
the New York programs at issue, full-time regular public school employees
taught remedial courses and delivered counseling and other services in religiously affiliated schools. The sectarian school classrooms were cleared of
religious symbols and religious materials were barred. Public school employees were required to avoid involvement in religious activities and to
keep contact with private school personnel to a minimum. To ensure compliance with these requirements, field supervisors made one unannounced
visit per term and reported to program coordinators, who also paid occa243
sional unannounced visits.
Arguably, teachers who taught classes could be "used, intentionally or
unwittingly, to inculcate the religious beliefs of the surrounding parochial
school" in violation of the second prong of Lemon. 24 Rather than reach
this issue, however, the Court concluded that the program's efforts to police
against unconstitutional effects impermissibly entangled government and
religion. The Court's reasoning tracked Lemon:
[P]ervasive monitoring by public authorities in the sectarian
schools infringes precisely those Establishment Clause values at the
root of the prohibition of excessive entanglement. Agents of the city
must visit and inspect the religious school regularly, alert for the
subtle or overt presence of religious matter. . . . In addition, the
religious school must obey these same agents when they make determinations as to what is and what is not a "religious symbol" and
241. I. at 619-20 (emphasis added). In Lemon, the Court also struck down a similar Penn-

sylvania law for the same reasons. Id at 620-22. Under the Pennsylvania statute, the state could
purchase "secular educational services" from sectarian schools. Id at 609-10. Reimbursement
was limited to secular courses taught in the public schools, using approved texts and materials.
Id at 620-21.
242. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
243. Ninety-two percent of the nonpublic schools to participate were sectarian. Id at 406-07.
244. Id at 409.
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thus off limits in a Title I classroom. In short, the religious school,
which has as a primary purpose the advancement and preservation
of a particular religion must endure the ongoing presence of state
personnel whose primary purpose is to monitor teachers and students in an attempt to guard against the infiltration of religious
thought.
The administrative cooperation that is required to maintain the
educational program at issue here entangles church and state in still
another way that infringes interests at the heart of the Establishment
Clause. Administrative personnel of the public and parochial school
systems must work together in resolving matters related to schedules, classroom assignments, problems that arise in the implementation of the program, requests for additional services, and the
dissemination of information regarding the program. Furthermore,
the program necessitates "frequent contacts between the regular and
the remedial teachers (or other professionals), in which each side
reports on individual student needs, problems encountered, and results achieved....
[T]he detailed monitoring and close administrative contact required to maintain New York City's Title I program can only prorelationship which the policy
duce "a kind of continuing day-to-day
245
of neutrality seeks to minimize.
3. Executive Action in Other Contexts
The Supreme Court has never invalidated a formally neutral, generally
applicable norm because its enforcement would cause unconstitutional
entanglement. While the Court has suggested that the Constitution could
invalidate regulatory oversight outside the context of religiously affiliated
primary and secondary schools,24 6 it appears that the analogy to the school
aid cases would have to be quite strong.

245. Id. at 413-14 (citations omitted). Other cases which involved aid to church-run primary
and secondary schools have come to parallel conclusions. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 369-70
(1975); see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254-55 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works,
426 U.S. 736, 748 n.15 (1976).
246. E.g., Bowen, 487 U.S. 589. When the Court considered whether the AFLA would nec-

essarily result in excessive entanglement it offered these comments:
ETihere is no reason to assume that the religious organizations which may receive grants
are "pervasively sectarian" in the same sense as the Court has held parochial schools to be.
There is accordingly no reason to fear that the less intensive monitoring involved here will
cause the Government to intrude unduly in the day-to-day operation of the religiously
affiliated AFLA grantees.
Id. at 616.
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In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop,24 7 all nine members of the Court believed
that application of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to lay teachers employed by church-operated schools threatened prohibited entanglement. 248 As a consequence, the five-member majority took pains to
conclude that the NLRA did not apply.2 49 This majority viewed the constitutional problem in these terms.
[When] charges of unfair labor practices [are] filed against religious
schools ... the schools ha[ve] responded that their challenged actions were mandated by their religious creeds. The resolution of
such charges by the Board, in many instances, will necessarily involve inquiry into the good faith of the position asserted by the
clergy-administrators and its relationship to the school's religious
mission. It is not only the conclusions that may be reached by the
board which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion
Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry leading to findings and
conclusions.
The Board's exercise of jurisdiction will have at least one other
impact on church-operated schools. The Board will be called upon
to decide what are "terms and conditions of employment" and
therefore mandatory subjects of bargaining....
"[I]ntroduction of a concept of mandatory collective bargaining,
regardless of how narrowly the scope of negotiation is defined, necessarily represents an encroachment upon the former autonomous
position of management.".... Inevitably the Board's inquiry will
implicate sensitive issues that open the door to conflicts between
clergy-administrators and the Board, or conflicts with negotiators
for unions. What we said in Lemon ... applies as well here.
250
The Court's central concern was that government might resolve religious
questions. Judges, not churches, might decide whether an employment related decision was required by church doctrine.2"'
247. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
248. Compareid at 501-04 (opinion of Burger, C.J.) with id at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The teachers would teach both secular and religious subjects.
Union organizations filed representation petitions with the NLRB for various religiously affiliated schools. In subsequent Board-supervised elections, unions prevailed and were certified as the
exclusive bargaining representative for lay teachers. Nevertheless, the schools refused to recognize the unions and refused to bargain. The unions then filed unfair labor practice complaints. In
defense, the schools claimed that they did not fall within the NLRB's discretionary jurisdiction,
and that the First Amendment precludes exercise of jurisdiction anyway. Id. at 493-94.
249. Id at 504-07.
250. d at 502-03 (footnotes and citations omitted).
251. In Amos, Justice Brennan concluded that the difficulty in distinguishing the difference
between religious and secular activities of religious organizations justified a blanket presumption
that nonprofit activities were religious. Justice Brennan explained:
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In other cases, where the oversight neither involved a pervasively sectarian religious organization, nor otherwise involved
resolution of religious questions, nor was substantial and ongoing,
the Court has uniformly and quite easily found entanglement claims
unpersuasive. The Court has rejected challenges springing from
aid to religiously affiliated colleges and universities;2" 2 to the recordkeeping provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act;2 53 to state sales and
use tax laws;254 and to the charitable deduction provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code.2 55
[D]etermining whether an activity is religious or secular requires a searching case-by-case
analysis. This results in considerable ongoing government entanglement in religious affairs.... While a church may regard the conduct of certain functions as integral to its
mission, a court may disagree. A religious organization therefore would have an incentive
to characterize as religious only those activities about which there would be no dispute....
As a result, the community's process of self-definition would be shaped in part by the
prospects of litigation. A case-by-case analysis for all activities therefore would both produce excessive government entanglement with religion and create the danger of chilling
religious activity.
Amos, 483 U.S. at 343-44 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted). See also Lee, 112 S. Ct. at
2656 (Religious autonomy is protected when government cannot condition invitation to speak on
religious speaker's agreement to restrict content of prayer.).
252. E.g., Roemer, 426 U.S. at 758-59 (In nonsectarian colleges and universities, secular activity can be separated from religious activity and entangling inspections are unnecessary); Tilton,
403 U.S. at 672.
253. In Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985), a unanimous Court easily brushed aside a claim that the record-keeping provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), as applied to the foundation's commercial activities, caused an excessive
entanglement with the foundation's religious endeavors. Id. at 305-06. The Court concluded that
the FLSA, which "merely requires a covered employer to keep records 'of the persons employed
by him and of the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment maintained by
him,'" involved only "routine and factual inquiries" that fell short of "the kind of government
surveillance" which constitutes excessive entanglement. Id. at 305.
254. In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990), a unanimous court held that application of California's sales and use tax to the sale of religious materials
did not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. Id. at 397. To collect the tax
would neither require an "official and continuing surveillance," nor an inquiry into the religious
content of the merchandise or the religious motivation of sellers or purchasers. Id. at 395-96.
255. In Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989), at issue was § 170 of the Internal
Revenue Code, which allows deductions for contributions to charitable and religious institutions,
like the petitioner's church, the church of Scientology. Id. at 689. The Court held that § 170
prohibited deduction of fixed fees paid for "auditing" and other spiritual services because the fees
were not unrequited payments, but payments made in exchange for something. Id. at 684-85. In
addition, the Court held that this scheme was consistent with the Establishment Clause: Excessive entanglement was avoided because the monitoring and administrative contact were minimal,
and no inquiry into religious doctrine was necessary. Id. at 696-97. Indeed, the Court noted that
to allow a deduction only for payment in exchange for religious services would threaten greater
entanglement because it could require government to decide which services and benefits are religious. Id. at 694, 697. Likewise, attempts to determine how much of a payment for auditing
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E.
1.

The Constraintsat Intersection

Government support for private religious speakers: An issue of
endorsement or subsidy?

The court's decisions involving government support for religious speech
by a private speaker indicate some intersection between the prohibitions
against endorsement and those against undue subsidy. The principles of
endorsement forbid certain religious exhortations by government. This
would mean little if government could simply substitute private persons for
government employees and thereby avoid the constitutional restrictions.
Thus, the prohibition against endorsement sometimes works to forbid gov2 56
ernment support for a religious message espoused by a private speaker.
Much religious activity, such as proselytizing, is also expressive. 25 7 Thus,
the prohibitions against undue subsidies could likewise work to forbid gov258
ernment support of a religious message espoused by a private speaker.
As noted earlier, the prohibition against endorsement is a limit on government speech; the restrictions on subsidies limit government donations.25 9
Essentially, endorsement speaks to the status given a religious message and
the expenditure of other government resources is incidental. By contrast,
the subsidy cases are centrally concerned with distribution of other government resources. The expenditure of government funds is the essence of the
constitutional transgression.

services was in exchange for the service and how much was a contribution could raise entanglement problems. Id. at 698 and n.12.
In dissent, Justices O'Connor and Scalia argued that the IRS policy at issue was a denominational preference invalid under Larson v. Valente. Id. at 713 (O'Connor and Scalia, JJ.,
dissenting).
256. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
257. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 284 (1981) (White, J., dissenting).
258. This is not to suggest that the more general endorsement inquiry employed by the Court
with increasing frequency asks the right questions in subsidy cases. For example, in the last
school-aid case, the Court suggested for the first time that government assistance may offend the
constitution by sending a prohibited message. In School Dist v. Ball, the Court found that the
programs "foster[ed] a close identification of [government] powers and responsibilities with those
of... religious denominations," and that this symbolic union of church and state conveyed an
impermissible message of endorsement. School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389-92 (1985).
This statement highlights the poor fit between a generally applicable endorsement standard
and the central inquiry in the subsidy cases. A general standard of endorsement would have
independent vitality only when a program does not provide an impermissible subsidy yet appears
to endorse religion. To make any sense in this context, endorsement must mean endorsement of
the religious mission of the school. If the Court finds that an education program presents little or
no risk that government employees or funds would support that religious mission, should the
program nevertheless be invalid because some students erroneously perceive such support, or
more vaguely make an association between government and religious education? See id. at 397.
259. See supra parts II B and C.
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Most often, it will be easy to determine the applicable frame of reference. 2 Even the apparently difficult public forum cases, Widmar v. Vincent,26 1 and Board of Education v. Mergens, 262 can easily be placed. At
issue in Widmar was the open forum policy at the University of Missouri at

Kansas City, under which the University made its facilities generally available to student groups. The University refused, however, to allow a student
group to use University facilities for religious worship and discussion.2 63
As a content based restriction on access to a public forum, the Court subjected the decision to strict scrutiny. 264 While the court assumed that
avoiding an Establishment Clause violation would be a sufficiently compelling reason, the Court held that allowing the group equal access would not
transgress Lemon. To the Court, the issue was whether the access would
run afoul of Lemon's proscription against the primary effect of advancement of religion. Under this standard, the Court held the benefits were
"incidental": The policy did not evidence an intent to approve religion, and
the benefits did not go mostly to religious groups.2 65
260. In any event, to the extent that it is difficult to determine whether status or support is the
root issue, it is unlikely that the two constraints would lead to different results. It is hard to
imagine that a subsidy which cannot be fairly attributed to a government decision to subsidize the
religious speech and which is constitutionally tolerable will nevertheless send a message that government endorsed religion, and vice versa. In the public forum cases discussed in this Section, for
example, the Court concluded that to grant religious speakers access to the expressive forum did
not send a message that government endorsed religion. The nondiscrimination which is the hallmark of a public forum, and the fact that the policies benefitted a wide array of groups, negated a
message of endorsement. Likewise, in neither case did the policy fairly evince a government decision to subsidize the religious speech.
261. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
262. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
263. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265.
264. Id at 270.
265. The Court concluded:
[T]his Court has explained that a religious organization's enjoyment of merely "incidental"
benefits does not violate the prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion....
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of our cases. Two factors are especially relevant.
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of state
approval on religious sects or practices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a
policy "would no more commit the University ... to religious goals" than it is "now
committed to the goals of the Students for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or any other group eligible to use its facilities....
Second, the forum is available to a broad class of nonreligious as well as religious
speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect .... If the
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, "a
church could not be protected by the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair." A least in the absence of empirical evidence that the religious groups
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Board of Education v. Mergens,166 involved the Federal Equal Access

Act, which sought to extend the reasoning of Widmar to public secondary
schools. 2

67

Under the Act, a school that maintains a "limited open forum"

cannot discriminate against students groups on the basis of the religious or
other contents of speech.26 The Court held that this requirement did not
violate Lemon.26 9 Six Justices concluded that the act had no unconstitutional effect because the school did not send a message to its students that it
endorsed religion. 0
Both Widmar and Mergens involved programs that offered general benefits and clearly served a legitimate secular objective. The essential govern-

ment activity was not communication of a particular message with a
will dominate UMKC's open forum...
forum's "primary effect."
Id. at 273-75 (citations omitted).

the advancement of religion would not be the

266. Id at 235-37.
267. Id
268. Id at 235. The religious classification in Mergens is consistent with the equality cases.
Eight Justices accepted the plurality's determination that the predominant secular purpose of the
Act was to prohibit discrimination against religious and other types of speech.
269. Id at 250.
270. Id. Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, White, and Blackmun concluded that:
[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect. We think that secondary school students are
mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support
student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.... The proposition
that schools do not endorse everything they fail to censor is not complicated.
Id (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (citations omitted). Several factors limited the risk of endorsement.
The Act limits participation by school officials and requires that meetings be held during noninstructional time, thereby eliminating the problems of students emulating teachers and of
mandatory attendance. Id at 250-51. Moreover, "the broad spectrum of officially recognized
student clubs at Westside, and the fact that Westside students are free to initiate and organize
additional student clubs... counteract any possible message of official endorsement of or preference for religion or a particular religious belief." Id. at 252.
Justices Marshall and Brennan, O'Connor, Rehnquist, White, and Blackmun all agreed that
the school must not send a religious message, but disagreed about how far apart the school must
stand from religious speech to avoid "a message that the school endorses rather than merely
tolerates that speech." Id at 264 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy would find a constitutional violation only if the school coerced students into
participating into a religious exercise. Id at 261-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He finds the endorsement inquiry no help because:
[A] public high school "endorses" a religious club, in a common-sense use of the term, if
the club happens to be one of many activities that the school permits students to choose in
order to further the development of their intellect and character in an extracurricular setting. But no constitutional violation occurs if the school's action is based upon a recognition of the fact that membership in a religious club is one of many permissible ways for a
student to further his or her own personal enrichment.
Id. at 261.
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religious component. Thus, broadly speaking, the cases present a question
of subsidy, not endorsement. This conclusion is reinforced by reference to
the elements of the constitutional prohibitions.
Recall the elements of the endorsement inquiry:
(1) The activity in question was in its essence expressive;
(2) government gave its approval to the specific message sent by
the expressive activity; and
(3) a reasonable observer would receive the message that government endorsed religion.
Compare the elements of the endorsement inquiry with the elements
that define undue subsidy:
(1) A subsidy;
(2) which directly underwrites specifically religious activity; and
(3) which can fairly be attributed to a government decision to subsidize the specifically religious activity.
Plainly, government did not give specific approval of the particular religious
messages at issue in Widmar or Mergens.271 Thus, the inquiry never proceeds to the crux of the constitutional issue: whether a reasonable observer
would receive the message that government supported religion.
Under the subsidy framework, however, the public forum cases would
proceed to the core constitutional problems. Access to school facilities
would be in-kind support which would directly underwrite specifically religious activity. Thus, it would be necessary to decide whether allowing religious groups access to such a public forum can be fairly attributable to a
government decision to subsidize specifically religious activity. To impose a
restriction against religious use would clearly thwart the legitimate objectives of an open forum program: Content-based restrictions on speech are
definitionally incompatible with a public forum for expression. In such circumstances, government cannot necessarily be said to employ the policy
because of the benefit religious activity would thereby receive. The question, therefore, becomes whether the benefit is nevertheless an unconstitutional subsidy.27 2 On this issue, four points need to be addressed.

271. See supra notes 260-70 and accompanying text.
272. Commentators have generally agreed that equal access for religious speakers is consistent with the Establishment Clause. See Laycock, supra note 142, at n.12 (1986). Contra Ruti
Teitel, When Separate is Equal Why OrganizedReligious Exercises, Unlike Chess, Do Not Belong
in the Public Schools, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 174 (1986) (arguing that access is not neutral); Ruti
Teitel, The Unconstitutionality of Equal Access Policies and Legislation Allowing Organized Student-InitiatedReligious Activities in the Public Schools: A Proposalfor a Unitary FirstAmendment
Forum Analysis Test, 21 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 529 (1986).
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First, it is against the very essence of an open forum to exclude a class of
speakers based on the content of their speech. That is, there is no way to
both avoid the benefit to religion and maintain the program's fundamental
premise. Second, the values served by the open forum policies are of constitutional significance. An open forum policy promotes both free speech and
free exercise values. 3 A activity must run afoul of a very strong policy of
disestablishment to justify the subordination of other First Amendment
principles.27 4 Third, there could be no claim that the open forum policies

were merely a guise under which government could underwrite religious
activity. The subsidy to religious activity was truly incidental to broader

program objectives.275 Finally, in Mergens, government took pains to ensure that the policy would not create opportunities for impermissible religious speech by government.2 76 Thus, government attempted to prevent

constitutional injury.
For many of these same reasons, Douglas Laycock has argued that
equal access policies are consistent with an overriding Establishment Clause
principle of neutrality.2 7 7 Professor Laycock states that the subsidy "argu-

ments are put in context when we recognize that the "effects" test [of
Lemon] was intended to implement the neutrality requirement." The subsidy is "incidental" to a policy of neutrality between religious and other
speech and is therefore permissible. The heart of the issue, however, is
more accessible through the elements of undue subsidy outlined above.
Neutrality is too abstract to suffice as decision-making construct. 27 But
neutrality can be given content by reference to the requirement that a subsidy be fairly attributable to a government decision to subsidize the specifi273. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 247; see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480
U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
274. Whether the constitution should allow a similar subsidy incident to a policy of lesser
importance is an open question. But this does not mean that the importance of the government
interest underlying a given policy must be compared to the degree of constitutional injury. A
lesser policy might simply give rise to an inference that the justification is a sham, that the benefit
to religion is not truly "incidental." In such circumstances, the subsidy might fairly be attributed
to a government decision to underwrite the specific religious activity.
275. This conclusion might be unwarranted, for instance, if program benefits went almost
exclusively to religious organizations.
276. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 235-37.
277. Professor Laycock argues that the Constitution requires equal access for religious
speech. Laycock, supra note 140.
278. Indeed, Professor Laycock has noted that neutrality is not self-defining and has been
used to mean quite different things. See Laycock, supra note 19. See also Michael W. McConnell,
Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. RPv. 146 (1986) (agreeing that religious
speakers should have a right of access but arguing that neutrality is an insufficient concept to
protect religious liberty); Ruti Teitel, When Separate is Equal:, supra note 272, (arguing that access is not neutral); Ruti Teitel, The Unconstitutionalityof Equal Access Policies, supra note 272.
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cally religious activity. 2 79 Deviation from neutrality is easy to see when a
program is directed to support the religious activities of religious groups, or
when government fails to employ restrictions to avoid direct support of religious activity when such restrictions are consistent with the program's
ends.
2.

Wallace v. Jaffree, Edwards v. Aquillard, and Bowen v. Kendrick
(i) Wallace v. Jaffree. Illicit classification or religious speech?

In Wallace v. Jaffree,28 0 the Court struck down an Alabama statute that
authorized a moment of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer
... ,"8'The majority affirmed the conclusion that the only purpose of the
new statute was to "express [ ] the State's endorsement of prayer [and that]
...the addition of 'or voluntary prayer' indicates that the State intended to
characterize prayer as a favored practice., 28 2 The statute thus violated the
first prong of Lemon. In addition, part of the decision treated the statute as
a precatory comment 28 3 and analyzed the case as a limit on government
speech. The Court stated that:
[T]he addition of "or voluntary prayer" indicates that the State intended to characterize prayer as a favored practice.... [We cannot]
treat this as an inconsequential case involving nothing more than a
few words of symbolic speech on behalf of the political majority.
For whenever the State itself speaks on a religious subject, one of the
questions we must ask is "whether the government intends
to con2 4
vey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion., 1
Under the models developed in this paper, Alabama can be seen to have
employed a religious classification without sufficient justification. Because
the Court concluded that there was no barrier to voluntary prayer during
the moment of silence, the law lifted no barrier to religious exercise. 2 5 The
difficulty with characterizing the law as one that employed a religious classification is that no government benefit or burden turned on whether what
one was doing qualified as "voluntary prayer. ' 28 6 Except, that is, benefits
279. See supra part II.B.[3].
280. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
281. Id. at 40.
282. Id. at 60.

283. Id. at 60-61 (This case involved "symbolic speech on behalf of the political majority.").
284. Id. at 60-61 (footnotes omitted). The Court easily concluded that it did. Id.
285. Id.

286. There was no credible claim that the inclusion of "voluntary prayer" was necessary to
remove an ambiguity over whether prayer was permitted. But see id. at 91 (White, J., dissenting)
("I would not invalidate a statute that at the outset provided the legislative answer to the question
"May I pray"). See Laycock, supra note 140, at 57-60 (meditation can connote prayer). Most of
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and burdens which flow from a religious statement by government. Those
who wished to pray were entitled to nothing more than those who did not.
Thus, while the equality framework seems a better doctrinal fit, the endorsement inquiry seems closer to the point.2 87

(ii) Edwards v. Aguillard" Illicit classification or endorsement of religious
speech?
In Edwards v. Aguillard,2 88 the Court invalidated the Louisiana "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public
School Instruction" Act for want of a clear secular purpose.2 8 9 Although
the statute did not mandate that either the theory of evolution or "creation
science" be taught in the public schools, it did require that if one was
290
taught, both be taught.
The Court's analysis fits within the principles of equality. The Court
found that the facially neutral reference to creation-science was, in reality, a
religious classification.
There is a historic and contemporaneous link between the teachings
of certain religious denominations and the teaching of evolution....
The preeminent purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was clearly
to advance the religious view that a supernatural being created humankind. The term "creation science" was defined as embracing
this particular religious doctrine by those responsible for the passage
of the Creationism Act.
The Legislation therefore sought to alter the science curriculum
to reflect endorsement of a religious view that is antagonistic to the
theory of evolution.
In this case, the purpose of the Creationism Act was to restructure the science curriculum to conform with a particular religious
viewpoint.2 9 1
The Court also concluded that the law lacked a sufficient justification.
Louisiana claimed the law advanced "academic freedom." The Court
found, however, that academic freedom was not forwarded by limiting a

the time, for government to define a classification as one which includes religion or religious activity will not send a message that religion or religious practice or belief is preferred.

287. To be sure, the problem is unusual. Few statutes will be found to be mere statements of
government opinion.
288. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
289. Hd at 585.
290. Id. at 581.
291. d at 590-593 (footnotes omitted).
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teacher's discretion over what to teach.292 Hence the Court took academic
freedom to mean a requirement that "all the evidence be taught." The
Court found, though, that no barrier existed to the teaching of the scientific
evidence for creationism.29 3
The decision also fits within the endorsement paradigm.2 94 Indeed, it
seems clear that the case meets the elements of unconstitutional endorsement outlined earlier in this paper. Teaching is essentially expressive; Louisiana gave its specific approval to the doctrine of creation-science; and,
under the Court's reasoning, a reasonable observer would perceive that
Louisiana favored a particular religious belief.
Indeed, the endorsement inquiry may be more to the point. The constitutional problem is that government chose to send a religious message.
Benefits and burdens attendant to the law result from one's identification
with the message. Perhaps Edwards illustrates that the principles of equality and endorsement can embrace consonant values. Here, government employed a religious classification in order to send a religious message. Again,
this is an unusual case; seldom will a statute require someone to speak.
(iii) Bowen v. Kendrick- Illicit classification, endorsement, or subsidy?
At issue in Bowen v. Kendrick295 was the Federal Adolescent Family
Life Act (AFLA), which sought to address problems associated with teenage sexual activity and pregnancy. The AFLA provided grants to public
and private nonprofit groups who provide "services and research in the area
of premarital adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy. '296 Grant recipients provided "care services" to help care for pregnant adolescent women
and adolescent parents, and to "prevention services" that work toward the
prevention of adolescent sexual relations.2 97
While the AFLA leaves it up to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services... to define exactly what types of services a grantee must
provide .... the statute contains a listing of "necessary services" that
292. Id. at 586-587.
293. Id. at 587.

294. Id. at 608 (O'Conner, J., concurring) ("[T]he First Amendment does not permit the
State to require that teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any
religious sect or dogma." Epperson v. Arkansas .... ") The Court also placed emphasis on the
fact that school children make an impressionable audience and that they are required by law to
attend school. Id. at 584.
295. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
296. Id. at 593.
297. Id. at 594. Grantees could not provide family planning services unless otherwise unavailable in the community and could not "advocate, promote, or encourage abortion." Id. at
596-97 (footnote omitted).
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may be funded. These services include pregnancy testing and maternity counseling, adoption counseling and referral services, prenatal
and postnatal health care, nutritional information, counseling, child
care, mental health services, and perhaps most importantly for present purposes, "educational services relating to family life and
problems
associated
with
adolescent
premarital
sexual
relations" .. 298
In addition, the Act's statement of purposes and findings noted that the
problems addressed by the Act, "are best approached through a variety of
integrated and essential services provided to adolescents and their families
by other family members, religious and charitable organizations, voluntary
associations, and other groups in the private sector as well as services provided by publicly sponsored initiatives."2 9 9 Funded projects, therefore,
must "use such methods as will strengthen the capacities of families ... to
make use of support systems such as other family members, friends, reli300
gious and charitable organizations, and voluntary associations.9
The Court addressed two challenges to the AFLA on its face. First, the
Court addressed whether the required involvement of religious organizations would have the primary effect of advancing religion."' Second, the
Court addressed the claim that grants to religious organizations might underwrite religious indoctrination, because educational services contemplated by the AFLA coincide with religious teachings.30 2
As to the first challenge, the Court found the required involvement of
religious groups constitutional. The effect of advancing religion was "at

most 'incidental and remote.'

"303

In addition, although the AFLA does require potential grantees to
describe how they will involve religious organizations in the provision of services under the Act, it also requires grantees to describe
the involvement of "charitable organizations, voluntary associations,
and other groups in the private sector .... In our view, this reflects
the statute's successful maintenance of a course of' 3neutrality
among
4
religions, and between religion and non-religion.
The Court also refused to invalidate the AFLA merely because religious
organizations are eligible grantees. On this issue, the Court treated the case
298. IM.at 594; see 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(8)(B), (a)(10)(c) (1988).
299. IM.at 595.
300. IaMat 596. As a consequence, grant applicants must describe how they will involve such
groups. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 596.

301. 487 U.S. at 605-06.
302. Id. at 606.
303. Id. at 607 (citations omitted).
304. Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
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as an analog of aid to religious education. The law was neutral and nothing
"indicate[d] that a significant proportion of the federal funds will be disbursed to 'pervasively sectarian' institutions" akin to religiously affiliated
primary and secondary schools.3 05 Thus, the AFLA was more like aid to
religiously affiliated colleges and universities than to sectarian elementary
and secondary schools. 30 6 As a consequence, the possibility that some aid
would go to pervasively sectarian religious organizations or underwrite religious indoctrination was an insufficient reason to invalidate the AFLA on
its face. 307 The Court's inquiry then turned to whether any grantees in fact
used program funds to promote religious doctrine, 0 8 or whether funds
could be channeled solely to secular activities. On this point, the majority
remanded the case for the development of a more complete record. 3° 9
Under the models developed in this paper, the AFLA arguably embodies an illicit religious classification by virtue of the provisions that require
involvement of religious groups. One interpretation of the majority opinion, however, is that the AFLA does not distinguish between religious and
analogous secular activity. Instead, the AFLA simply lists the set of groups
to be involved, religious and nonreligious. A classification does not become
religious merely because religious groups fall within it. Likewise, a classification should not become religious merely because it is defined to include
religious groups. Accepting this determination, the AFLA passes the initial
hurdle of regulatory equality.
If used to underwrite religious indoctrination, the AFLA would easily
meet the elements of a prohibited subsidy consisting of cash support for
specifically religious activity. Moreover, any subsidy in Bowen v. Kendrick
would be fairly attributable to the government. If government deliberately
chose to employ religious organizations who used religious doctrine to
counsel against pregnancy, it would have selected religious means to forward the goals of the program. If government did not so choose, but that
was the effect of the program anyway, the subsidy would still be fairly attributable to government, because government would have failed to enforce
3 10
existing conditions on the grants which forbade religious teaching.
305. Id. at 610.
306. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 610-12.
307. Id. at 611-13.
308. Id. at 620-22. Of the five members in the majority, three would apparently find aid to a
pervasively sectarian institution, without more, a violation. Two would not. See id. at 624-25
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
309. Id. at 620-21.
310. Id at 616, 623. Professor McConnell argues that religious organizations should be subject to only those conditions on receipt of program benefits to which secular recipients are subject.
Thus, the conditions on program funds in Tilton v. Richardson, supra notes 113-116, should be
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Viewed either way, government went forward without religious use restrictions because of the benefit it would thereby confer on religious activity.
III.

CONCLUSION

In the era of Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Establishment Clause has served
as an umbrella under which four essentially separate constitutional protections have gathered. Each of the four protects against government activity
that most would view as plainly incompatible with minimum constitutional
standards of disestablishment. Properly understood, each is well suited to
address these underlying, animating concerns. And, properly understood,
each can be seen as a rather narrow constraint that has not extended far
beyond core concerns.
Few would argue that a law which awards government contracts first to
atheists, or which allows only Seventh Day Adventists to be pharmacists, is
constitutionally unobjectionable. The first protection guards against this
problem. The Establishment Clause embodies a principle of religious equality that works like the principle of racial equality contained in the Equal
Protection Clause. Government may neither impose burdens nor distribute
benefits on the basis of religious affiliation. Religious classifications, especially those that manifest a denominational preference, bear a heavy presumption of invalidity. For the most part, the principle of religious equality
makes religious affiliation legally irrelevant. Indeed, religious classifications
have been accepted for only one reason: to remove a burden on religious
exercise. Even then, the law must carefully serve that purpose. This should
not be seen to understate the significance of defining the bounds of permissible government accommodation of the free exercise of religion; this is one of
the unresolved issues of signal importance.
The second protection is against undue government subsidy of religious
activity. Again, few would posit that the Constitution imposes no barrier to
a city's plan to divide its tax revenue among local churches. In this vein,
the cases have forbidden government programs targeted to support the religious activities of religious organizations. One might take issue with the
Court's decision to equate religiously affiliated primary and secondary
invalidated. McConnell, supranote 74, at 184. However, in Bowen v. Kendrick government could
forbid religious teaching because the AFLA "was not a program that permitted free speech about
controversial topics of the grantees' choice." I4 at 187. This effort to distinguish Bowen v. Kendrick from Tilton v. Richardson is unpersuasive. In Bowen v. Kendrick, grant recipients were not
just forbidden from speaking on sundry controversial topics of the recipient's choice. Rather,
religiously affiliated grant recipients could not articulate their religious basis for backing the very
message that the program sought to send. Presumably, other grant recipients could give their
reasons for counseling against adolescent sexual activity.
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schools with churches, and equate their educational functions with proselytizing. Nonetheless, it does not take a far-reaching idea of subsidy to strike
down a program designed to support the religious activities of churches.
Broader programs have routinely been allowed to provide aid to the secular
activities of religiously affiliated organizations. Indeed, at least in some circumstances, aid can even go to the religious activities of religious organization, if that is the unavoidable consequence of staying true to the program's
objective. Creating a mechanism to evaluate such unavoidable subsidies is
perhaps the second issue of signal importance.
The third protection is against religious exhortations by government.
Again, few would find fault with a constitutional rule that forbade government from painting "Offer up your devotions to God your Creator, and his
Son Jesus Christ, the Redeemer of the world!" in giant red letters spread
from the top to the bottom of the Washington Monument. I suspect it
would make little difference to most people whether government employees
or private citizens did the painting. If some religious statements violate the
Constitution, and others do not, the constitutional standard must separate
the permissible from the forbidden. That is the defining focus of the endorsement inquiry. To gain wide acceptance of a single method for determining when government crosses the constitutional line is the unfinished
task in this area.
The fourth and final protection is against government intrusion into certain church affairs. Once more, few would say that a judge should hear a
woman's claim that the Roman Catholic Church misconstrued scripture
when it decided that women shall not be priests. The Constitution essentially renders such questions of church doctrine, discipline, and governance
nonjustifiable. Analogal principles restrain executive action. Government
may not enforce regulations that contemplate ongoing and extensive administrative oversight and require government to resolve religious issues. By
default, churches retain autonomy over certain matters. Whether this
group of decisions is a closed set remains to be seen.
That is not to say that the prohibitions are unrelated. There is a single
prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion. Yet the
same wrong, broadly speaking, may manifest itself in various forms of government behavior. Justice O'Connor may have identified the chief constitutional evil: Where government practices "make religion relevant, in reality
or public perception, to status in the political community."3'1 1 Still, a single
constitutional standard is clumsy method for discerning even this single
wrong in various contexts. Government may make religion relevant to
311.

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1989).
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one's standing in the political community in different ways depending on
whether government acts as lawmaker, speaker, benefactor, or judge.
Indeed, almost by definition, illegitimate lawmaking, illicit giving, government proselytizing, and religious refereeing take divergent shapes. Any
unitary approach to Establishment Clause problems is therefore likely to be
too general to be sufficiently focused in many cases. When does a regulation have an unconstitutional effect of advancing religion? When it employs
a religious classification. When does a social welfare program endorse religion? When, in fact, government directs an unnecessary subsidy to religious activity. Constitutional constraints should be fitted to the particular
constitutional evil. The models developed in this paper work toward this
end.
A judicial opinion designed to recast the existing constraints of the establishment clause in terms sensitive to the differing nature of these four
problems might look something like this:
"In Lemon, the Court identified the "three main evils against which the
establishment clause was intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.'
Waltz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). In the more than two
decades since, the cases have employed four constraining principles, in large
part to protect against those problems.
First. Principles of equality restrain the imposition of burdens or
the provision of benefits on religious grounds. Thus, classifications
which purposefully discriminate on the basis of denominational affiliation are subject to strict scrutiny. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228
(1982). Other religious classifications have been justified only as a
means of removing a barrier to religious exercise. E.g., Corporation
of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (regulatory
barrier to religious exercise). C.f. Board of Education v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226 (1990) (barriers to religious speech and association);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136
(1987) (state could excuse religiously motivated activity from otherwise applicable restriction on payment of unemployment compensation benefits); Estate of Thorton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985)
(Sabbath observance not grounds for discharge by private employer.). Even then, the effort to accommodate religious exercise
must be closely tailored to that end. Larson v. Valente, 455 U.S. 252
(denominational preference too blunt a mechanism). See also Texas
Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (underinclusive classification
invalidated); Estate of Thorton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (Burden on
third parties must be considered.).
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Second. Government may not provide an undue subsidy to religious activity. This principle is violated if:
[a] a subsidy;
[b] directly underwrites specifically religious activity; and
[c] can fairly be attributed to a government decision to subsidize the specifically religious activity.
The benefit at issue in these cases is a grant of gift or money, or
some support in-kind. The first element therefore distinguishes government action which is judged by the principles of equality. Compare Estate of Thorton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (benefit a result of a
regulatory preference for religious activity) with Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)
(Formally neutral program provided an undue subsidy.).
Presumptively, government aid to pervasively sectarian religious
institutions, like sectarian primary and secondary schools, underwrites religious activity. A very high showing that the aid will be
used for only secular purposes is required to overcome this presumption. Financial aid is almost categorically prohibited. E.g., Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756; Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty
v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 471 (1973). Many forms of
non-financial aid are likewise forbidden. E.g., School District v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). Compare Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229 (1977). On the other hand, if the recipient is not a pervasively
sectarian religious organization, government need make less of a
showing that the aid will not underwrite religious activity directly.
See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672 (1971) (religiously affiliated colleges and universities).
The third element requires that decision to support the religious
activity be fairly attributable to the government. Fair attribution
has been present when the program itself was directed to support the
religious activities of religious groups, Ball, 473 U.S. 373, or when
government failed to employ restrictions to avoid direct support of
religious activity, at least to the extent that restrictions would not
frustrate the program's ends. Compare Tilton, 403 U.S. 672 (restrictions on religious used employed and program upheld) with Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (restrictions on religious use would frustrate program ends). The intervening decision of a third party can
negate attribution of the subsidy to the government. Whitters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986). Compare Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (role of
third party choice sufficient) with Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (role of
third party choice insufficient).
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Third. There are limits on religious exhortations by government.
Religious speech by government violates the establishment clause
when:
[a] the activity in question was in its essence expressive.
[b] government gave its approval to the specific message sent
by the expressive activity, and
[c] a reasonable observer would receive a message from government that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or
preferred.
The first element limits the reach of this constitutional prohibition to religious speech. E.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649
(1992) (prayer); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)
(display of religious symbol); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)
(display of religious text).
The second element requires that government can fairly be said
to have made a choice to support the particular message. This can
mean that government sent the message, Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S.
28 (1985) (precatory statute), or that government selectively facilitated the message. E.g., Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (government selected
speaker and message at public school graduation); County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (Government sponsored creche display and
gave special access to government property.). Compare Widmar,
454 U.S. 263 (1981) (public forum).
The third element sets the constitutional boundaries. The question is whether a reasonable observer, aware of all the salient facts,
would perceive government favoritism for religion or a particular
religious belief. See County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. 573. Cf. Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 687-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This inquiry is undertaken "with a sensitivity to the unique circumstances
and context of a particular challenged practice." County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 629 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Nevertheless,
four factors emerge as dispositive: the strength and clarity of the
religious message; the extent to which government can be seen to
stand behind the message; the audience to whom the message is sent;
and whether any contextual factors, like the history and ubiquity of
the practice, tend to negate the message that government has endorsed religion. See, e.g., id.; Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2649.
Fourth. The Establishment Clause disables government from
resolving religious questions, and thereby leaves a zone where religious organizations retain autonomy. The Establishment Clause
renders nearly all decisions as to a church's creed, governance, or
discipline nonjusticiable. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
Similarly, the Establishment Clause can forbid offensive regulatory
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supervision by administrative officials. At a minimum, government
may not enforce regulations when to do so would require administrative resolution of religious issues and mandate extensive, ongoing
oversight. E.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Compare
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (substantial oversight of religious matters raised constitutional issues) with Tony
& Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290
(1985) (relatively insubstantial oversight of secular matters
constitutional)."

